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This dissertation examines several questions in public finance, including health
care, workers’ compensation program, and tax rebates. The first chapter, entitled, “Fi-
nancial Incentives and Physicians Behavior: Evidence from Texas Workers Compensation
Medical Claims”, examines whether financial incentives influence the quantity and com-
position of medical care provided by physicians. I study this question by leveraging an
administrative change in the maximum allowed reimbursement rates for surgical services
performed in a hospital setting for Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims. I docu-
ment evidence of strong substitution in the location of care, indicating that many surgical
services can be provided in either a hospital or office setting. I find that the 2% increase in
surgical services provided in a hospital setting in response to this reform is fully offset by
reduced utilization in an office setting. I also find that nonsurgical services performed in a
hospital increased in response to the reform, suggesting surgical and nonsurgical services
are complements with respect to physician financial incentives. More generally, my re-
sults suggest that the location of care is responsive to financial incentives, and an optimal
payment policy should account for substitution along this margin.
v
The second chapter, entitled “Cash-on-Hand and Demand for Credit”, examines
the effect of tax rebates on demand for small dollar credit loans. Subprime consumers
often use small dollar credit to meet short-term financial needs over pay cycles. However,
relatively little is known about the income sensitivity of demand for credit in this market.
This chapter provides a causal estimate of the effect of tax rebates on the demand for
small dollar credit, using shocks from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) benefits and
a unique proprietary loan-level dataset. The results show that a $100 increase in EITC
benefits leads to a 8.3% in the number of loan applications and a 6.6% reduction in the
number of borrowers. This could translate into sizable reductions in loan volume and
savings in financial charges. The estimates are robust to various specifications checks.
The results further indicate that EITC recipients are liquidity constrained. More broadly,
the results suggest that public programs with income benefits could help recipients with
consumption smoothing in the presence of credit market frictions.
The third chapter, entitled “Take-up of Workers’ Compensation Insurance in Texas”,
is coauthored with Marika Cabral and Michael Dworsky. This chapter examines how em-
ployers choose to provide benefits for their workers. Workers’ compensation program is a
large government program which provides monetary and medical benefits to injured work-
ers. Texas is currently the only state that allows voluntary participation. Using difference-
in-differences variation in regulated manual premium, this paper empirically analyzes em-
ployers’ take-up of workers’ compensation insurance coverage. We find that 10% increase
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Chapter 1
Financial Incentives and Physicians’ Behavior: Evidence
from Texas Workers’ Compensation Medical Claims
1.1 Introduction
Insurer reimbursement for a particular medical service often depends on the loca-
tion in which the service is provided. The same service is often paid at a different rate
depending on whether that service was provided at physicians’ offices or within a hospital
outpatient department. For example, in 2014 Medicare paid three times more for a level
IV nerve injection when performed in a hospital than for the same service performed in
a freestanding physician’s office. This variation in payments raises questions about how
these differential payments across locations of care affect the supply of medical services.
In order to optimally design medical reimbursement schedules, it is important to assess
whether and how much physicians respond to these differential payments by shifting the
location of the care they provide.
This paper explores the impact of differential payments by location of care within
the setting of the Texas’ Workers Compensation system. Using administrative medical
claims data, I examine the effect of a sharp increase in the maximum reimbursement rate
for surgical services provided within a hospital setting on the quantity and composition of
medical services across different locations of care.
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In 2008, Texas increased the maximum reimbursement rates for surgical services
performed in a hospital setting by 25% for Workers’ Compensation medical claims. Tak-
ing advantage of this legislated change in allowable reimbursement rates, I document a
strong first-stage effect on the average per patient payment to physicians. This analysis
reveals that the average payment per patient increased by 6% for surgical services as a
result of the change in the maximum allowable reimbursement rate. I then leverage this
induced variation in payments to estimate the effect on the quantity and composition of
medical care provided.
My analysis reveals that surgical services performed within a hospital setting in-
creased by 2% in response to the payment increase. However, I find that this increase
was fully offset by a decline in the number of surgical services provided within an office
setting, meaning that the reform had no impact on the total quantity of surgical services
provided. These results suggest strong substitution in the location of care among surgical
procedures, and this pattern is robust to the inclusion of service fixed effects.
Further, I investigate the impact on nonsurgical services, which are not explicitly
targeted by the reform but may have been indirectly affected. I find the quantity of non-
surgical services provided in a hospital increased by 4% in response to this policy change,
indicating that surgical services and nonsurgical services are complements. In addition,
I document heterogeneity in this effect among nonsurgical services which illustrates that
the effect is strongest for those nonsurgical services that are typically provided alongside
surgical services. Accounting for these substitution patterns, my results suggest that the
overall effect of this reform was an increase in the total quantity of medical care by 4.5%
on average, where most of this increase comes from an increase in complementary non-
2
surgical services provided within a hospital setting.
More generally, my results indicate that it is important to account for complements
and substitutes when evaluating the effect of a change in reimbursements. While some
prior studies have investigated demand side complementarities based on changes in pa-
tient cost-sharing (e.g., Cabral and Cullen 2011; Philipson and Goldman 2007; Chandra
et al. 2010; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015), there has been little evidence on supply side com-
plementarities based on changes in physician reimbursements. This paper contributes to
the existing literature by documenting meaningful supply side complementarities in the
location that care is provided and in the types of services performed. The empirical find-
ings of this paper suggest that the design of medical fee schedules could be a useful policy
tool to influence the location in which care is provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 1.3 describes the institutional setting and data. Section 1.4 discusses
the empirical strategy and identification assumptions. Section 1.5 shows the empirical
analysis. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several areas of prior literature. Much of the prior lit-
erature on physician financial incentives has focused on whether the supply curve for
physicians’ services is upward sloping or backward bending. McGuire and Pauly (1991)
develop a comprehensive theoretical model of physician behavior that accommodates both
inducement behavior and profit maximization, and also recognizes that physicians provide
3
services to multiple markets.1 Recent studies (e.g., Hadley and Reschovsky 2006; Mitchell
et al. 2000; Hadley et al. 2001; Clemens and Gottlieb 2014) that incorporate elements of
the McGuire-Pauly model find the supply of Medicare services is positively related to
Medicare payment, but inversely related to payments for competing or substitute services.
My analysis in this paper reveals a small positive price elasticity of supply of medical care,
supporting the upward-sloping supply curve. The estimated elasticity of supply of medical
care in the present context is smaller than the elasticity estimated in Clemens and Gottlieb
(2014), who use changes in payments across-the-board for all services. Among the many
possible explanations for this difference in magnitudes across the different settings, sub-
stitution between alternative locations for providing care may explain the smaller effects I
find in this context.
This paper also extends the line of research on physician incentives further by an-
alyzing whether the location of care is responsive to financial incentives. The location of
1 Another important insight delivered by McGuire and Pauly (1991) is the interdependence of the mar-
kets for medical services when there is more than one potential payer. This interdependence was highlighted
in a recent study by Heaton (2012) on the effects of the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform. Heaton’s re-
search shows that the billing of emergency room visits to workers compensation is related to the availability
of Medicaid. Powell and Seabury (2013) find that the reduction in medical care generosity for work-related
injuries affect post-injury earnings, especially for workers with lower back injuries. This study does not ac-
count for interdependence between Workers’ Compensation and other payers, such as private group health
insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid. The medical services delivered in the context of Workers’ Compensation
is not a significant proportion of total business. The Workers’ Compensation system overall accounts for only
2% of medical expenditures in the economy in 2012. In 2012, workers’ compensation medical payments
benefits paid (excluding cash benefits) totaled about $30.9 billion (Sengupta et al., 2014). In comparison,
total cost of medicare is about $566.44 billion, and national health expenditures is $2.79 trillion in 2012,
according to statistics from CMS. Therefore, in the absence of micro-level data covering all-payer claims,
there is little prospect of uncovering spillovers of fee schedule changes into other channels of provision of
medical services. For the purpose of quantifying the effect of Workers’ Compensation fee schedule changes
on the price level and the consumption of medical services provided by physicians in the context of Workers’
Compensation, disregarding such potential spillovers does not compromise the findings.
4
care is an important factor in the design of medical fee schedule, given regulatory con-
cerns regarding outpatient surgery (Quattrone, 2000) and payment variations across set-
tings (Wynn et al., 2008). The empirical analysis in this paper fits within McGuire and
Pauly (1991)’s model that has with multiple services (or locations) and one payer. I find
providers are vary elastic in the location they provide care, suggesting that it is necessary
to take into account behavioral responses along this margin when researchers evaluate the
effects of medical fee schedules changes on total medical spending.
Another contribution of this paper is to extend the prior literature on physician
financial incentives by examining a setting in which there may be supply-side comple-
mentarities. My results suggest that surgical and non-surgical services are complements
with respect to provider reimbursement. Prior studies have focused on the demand-side
complementarities based on changes in patient cost-sharing (e.g., Cabral and Cullen 2011;
Philipson and Goldman 2007; Chandra et al. 2010). This paper provides direct evidence of
supply-side complementarities in the types of services performed by leveraging changes in
physician reimbursements for surgical services and estimating the effect on both surgical
and non-surgical services.
Lastly, this paper also contributes to the small body of existing research studying
Workers’ Compensation reimbursement schedules. Most of the prior research on medical
fee schedules within Workers’ Compensation are based on case studies (e.g., Schmid and
Lord 2012; Corro and Robertson 2011). In contrast, this paper leverages a large legislated
change in reimbursements to examine the effect on the composition and location of care
provided within a large Workers’ Compensation program.
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1.3 Background and Data
1.3.1 Texas Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ Compensation (WC) is a state-regulated insurance program that pays
medical bills and replaces partial lost wages for employees with work-related injuries or
illnesses. It also protects covered employers from potential civil suits brought by injured
workers. In Texas, it is not mandatory for all employers to carry occupational injury
insurance coverage.2 Employers could choose to purchase worker compensation insurance
policies to cover income benefits and medical benefits for work-related injuries.
The Texas Workers’ Compensation law lists four types of benefits: income, med-
ical, death, and burial. Income benefits replace a portion of the wages a worker loses
because of a work-related injury or illness and provide compensation for permanent im-
pairment to a worker’s body.3 Medical benefits pay for any medical care that is reasonable
and necessary to treat a work-related injury or illness. The employer’s Workers’ Com-
pensation insurance company pays medical benefits directly to the physician or healthcare
provider who treated the injured worker. Except in an emergency, the injured worker
chooses the treating doctor, who must approve all medical care for an injury or illness.4
2 Private sector employers have been allowed the option of choosing to purchase workers’ compensation
insurance since 1913. Texas is currently the only state that allows any private-sector employer the option
of not purchasing WC insurance or become “nonsubscribers” to the state WC system. There are, however,
still some exceptions, such as construction contracts for governmental entities; in such cases, the insurance
requirements are mandatory. Several states’ laws have exceptions that allow small private sector employers
to opt out of coverage.
3 The four types of income benefits are temporary income benefits, impairment income benefits, supple-
mental income benefits, and lifetime income.
4 Currently, injured workers in Texas have the ability to select their own initial treating doctor. In turn,
the treating doctor provides medical care to the injured worker and submits those bills to the employer’s
insurance carrier for payment. The insurance carrier has the ability to review the medical necessity of treat-
ments provided to injured workers and pays medical bills in accordance with the fee guideline established
6
The Texas Workers’ Compensation system was designed as a fee-for-service sys-
tem which allows healthcare providers to submit bills and receive payment for each ser-
vice they deliver to injured workers without the use of pre-paid case rates, co-payments,
deductibles or co-insurance arrangements.5 For injured workers, there is no out-of-pocket
costs for claiming medical benefits.
In 2008, the total payroll covered by workers’ compensation was $270 billion and
the total premium paid was $2.62 billion. Medical costs make up more than 65% of Work-
ers’ Compensation costs in Texas. For more than 90% of the medical claims, patients
received at least one professional service. During the period studied in this paper, profes-
sional costs have increased steadily, and make up more than 50% of total medical costs for
Workers’ Compensation claims (TDI, 2014).
In this paper, I focus on medical benefits and reimbursement rates for professional
services provided by physicians. The maximum allowed reimbursement rates (MAR) for
physicians for Workers’ Compensation claims are set based on the reimbursement rates for
by the TWCC. Disputes over medical payments or the medical necessity of treatments are handled admin-
istratively through the TWCC. When a patient visits a medical office for the first time, it is important for
the physician to determine if any injury or illness is work-related. If the patient’s injury or illness is work-
related, the physician’s office should determine if the employer has Workers’ Compensation coverage. If
the coverage is under the Texas Workers’ Compensation system, then the physician must follow the statute,
rules, and guidelines of the state of Texas. These rules mandate reporting requirements, pre-authorization
of certain procedures and services, prescribed billing forms, and specific time frames for filing. Workers’
compensation law and rules also define different roles for doctors, how the physician’s examination impacts
the injured workers’ income benefits, and the expected reimbursement for healthcare services.
5 The Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (TWCC) administers the Texas Workers’ Compen-
sation Act and is mandated to adopt specific administrative rules, including the Medical Fee Guidelines.
An important medical cost-control mechanism in many states is the physician fee schedule, which specifies
maximum allowable reimbursements for specific medical services provided to treat WC claimants. Most
states use such fee schedules to regulate payments to doctors and there is a substantial body of research to
document that fee schedules are effective in controlling WC medical costs.
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Medicare.6 For professional services, the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS)
is used, in which payments for services are determined by the resource costs needed to pro-
vide them.7 The cost of providing each service is divided into three components: physician
work, practice expense, and professional liability insurance. Payments are calculated by
multiplying the combined costs of a medical service by a conversion factor. The conver-
sion factor used for Texas Workers’ Compensation claims is set as a scaling factor times
the Medicare conversion factors for all medical services. Specifically, in area a, for service
j in year t, payment is given as:
MARajt = Conversion Factort ×RV Uj ×Geographic Adjustment Factora
The Relative Value Units (RVUs) associated with each service are intended to mea-
sure the resources and costs required to provide that service. RVUs are constant across
areas while varying across services.8 Payments are also adjusted for geographical differ-
ences in resource costs using the Geographic Adjustment Factor.
From March 2008, there was an 25% increase in the conversion factor for surg-
eries performed in facility settings. Table 1.2 shows the conversion factor over time and
by place and type of services. This change in the conversion factor means there was a 25%
proportional change in the maximum allowed reimbursement rates. It is worth empha-
6 Although the payers for workers compensation medical benefits are mostly private insurers, the maxi-
mum allowed reimbursement rates are regulated by the Texas Department of Insurance.
7 The fee schedule assigns a fixed Relative Value Units (RVUs) to each medical service, which are
determined according to the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), initially developed by Hsiao
et al. (1988).
8 The conversion factor is a multiplier that is determined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to convert the quantity of care to monetary amount. It is updated annually.
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sizing that this policy change is on the maximum amount of reimbursement allowed for
Workers’ Compensation claims, not the actual amount paid to providers. The maximum
reimbursement rates are binding for insurers and providers who do not have any existing
agreement, which makes up about 84% of all medical claims. Insurers can negotiate with
hospitals and physicians to pay lower than this regulated rate. The relationship between
the fee schedule amount and the market price for the medical service can affect the degree
to which administrative changes in reimbursement affect provision of care.9 In the section
of empirical analysis, I analyze the impact of this policy change on the actual amount paid
to providers as a first stage.
1.3.2 Data
Data for this project comes from multiple sources. The primary data is medical
claims public use files on professional services from Texas Department of Insurance (TDI).
Medical claims submitted from 2005 to 2012 are used for this analysis.10 The data set
excludes transactions and payments associated with medical services provided by hospitals
and ambulatory surgical centers but includes transactions related to services delivered by
physicians at these places of service. These claim-level data contain rich information
on medical diagnosis and treatment for patients and are likely to be highly accurate and
9 Because WC reimbursements for medical services are not necessarily at the fee schedule amount, the
changes in WC reimbursements are not always strictly proportional to fee schedule changes. When a state
fee schedule is changed for a specific service, the percentage change in WC reimbursements for that service
could be similar to, smaller than, or even larger than the percentage change in the fee schedule.
10 Claims prior to 2005 are not publicly available. Though medical claims from early 2013 are available,
there is some lag in processing claims data and claims could go through revisions or adjustments by insurers
after submission. To have comparable medical claims and minimize the problem of truncations, claims from
2013 are excluded from analysis.
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complete, as claims are directly reported by WC insurers.11
As typical in medical claims data sets, we have data on medical information in-
cluding HCPCS/CPT codes, ICD-9 codes, place of service, the total amount charged, the
total amount paid, date of service, provider information, including address, license num-
ber, and NPI, and patients’ characteristics, such as date of injury, date of birth, mailing
address, and employer’s location. I rely on the HCPCS/CPT codes to classify medical
services into surgical and nonsurgical services and use place of services codes to define
facility and nonfacility settings.12
To supplement the medical claims data, I also use Physician Masterfile from Texas
Medical Board, a registry of all physicians licensed to practice in Texas, to obtain more
detailed characteristics on providers, such as their primary and secondary specialty, age,
and location. This masterfile can be matched with claims data using physicians’ state
license numbers.13
11 Overall, less than 5% of claims are disputed, according to statistics from TDI. These data are updated
each month and reflect the resolution of any disputed claims.
12 See the appendix A.1 on data construction for more details.
13 Data on treatment and return-to-work guidelines from Official Disability Guidelines (ODG) is also
used to understand the recommended courses of treatment and average duration of injuries for injured work-
ers. Information on premiums of Workers’ Compensation insurance in Texas and at the national level are
from the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services. Aggregated data on medical benefits and




Table 1.1 shows the classification of place of services. In most cases, facility means
in a hospital setting, while nonfacility refers to an office setting.14 Hospitals, including
outpatient, inpatient, and emergency room visits, make up for 76% of the visits to facilities.
Physicians’ offices, combining offices and health clinics, make up for 62% of the visits to
nonfacility settings.
At the medical bill level, most bills are for nonsurgical services (95.91%). Among
nonsurgical services, 93% of the procedures are performed in nonfacility settings, such
as physician’s office.15 Among surgical services, more than half (58%) are performed in
facility settings, such as hospital. Payment is set differently for facility and non-facility
settings to compensate for differential costs and risks.16
Table 1.3 lists the five most common surgical and nonsurgical services. Common
surgical services include injections, venipuncture, etc. Common nonsurgical services in-
clude mostly office visits and therapeutic activities. Surgical services are not necessarily
complicated or risky surgeries. Some of the surgical services with high volumes are diag-
nostic and non-invasive types of treatment.17 The average cost and share in facility vary
14 Classification of place of services is based on CMS. For details on place of services, see this listing
from CMS.
15 Throughout this paper, a claim means a unique work-related injury or illness for an employee. Each
claim can have multiples bills submitted during the course of treatment. For each bill, if more than one
service is provided, there could be multiples lines. Each line represents a distinct type of service.
16 A service or procedure is defined by HCPCS Level I (or CPT) codes. Throughout this paper, the term
“service” and “procedure” are used interchangeably. Both refer to the HCPCS (or CPT) code, as a measure
of unit of medical care.
17Common invasive surgical services include arthrodesis and laminectomy. Examples for less invasive
surgical services include sutures and debridement procedures.
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across medical services from less than 1% to 85%. It is worth noting that even for non-
surgical services, there are substantial share of medical procedures performed in facility
for some nonsurgical medical services, such as blood count (52%) and radiologic exami-
nation (19%). Nonsurgical services are on average less expensive than surgical services.
Testings, such as blood count and radiologic exams, cost around $10, while injections can
cost more than $200.
To provide some context about the typical medical treatment for worker compensa-
tion claims, table 1.4 presents the summary statistics from Workers’ Compensation med-
ical claims data. On average, there are 2.9 million medical claims and about 163,431
employees filing for Workers’ Compensation claims each year. The average duration of
treatment for injured workers is about 26 days. The average amount paid per claim is about
$231, which is less than half of the total amount charged.18 The WC payments to physi-
cians is more generous than Medicare payments, but less generous compared to private
group health insurance.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
As described previously, the Texas Workers’ Compensation system increased the
maximum allowed reimbursement for surgical services in a hospital setting by 25% start-
ing in March 2008. I first show that the actual payment to providers increased as a result
of the administrative increase in reimbursement policy, as a first stage. Then I examine
18 Cost of medical claims, if covered by Workers’ Compensation insurance, are paid by insurers to
providers. The charged amount is submitted by healthcare providers. Amount charged might not accurately
reflect the true costs of medical treatment.
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the impact on total quantity of surgical services by location of care received by injured
workers. I also investigate possible spillover effects for nonsurgical services, which are
not directly impacted by this policy.
1.4.1 Estimating Equations
To investigate the impact on the composition of care received by patients, I com-
pare outcomes for workers who started their worker compensation medical claims at dif-
ferent points in time. For example, workers who started treatment in early 2007 are not
affected by the policy change. However, workers who are otherwise similar but started
treatment in June 2008 are affected.
Before presenting the estimation equations, I first define the measure of price and
quantity of medical care, which are used as outcome variables in the empirical analysis.
For the outcome variable in the first-stage analysis, I calculate the average payment per





For the quantity of medical services, I calculate the total quantity of medical services per





where j is the index for each distinct type of medicare service (identified by HCPCS code
in data), i is the index for each patient, t is the index for the year when the patient first
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started treatment. RV Uijt is the total units of RVUs for medical service j for patient i in
year t, and Pjt is the average price per RVU for medical service j in year t.19 When I look
specifically at the price or quantity of a subset of medical services s, for example, surgical
services, I will restrict the summation to the set where medical services j belong to the
specific subset s (i.e., j ∈ s ).
For the measure of price, I fix the quantity and composition of medical service at
base year to (RV Uijto) and use the price of medical services at year t (Pjt) to construct the
average payment per patient. This measure of price allows costs to change as reflected in
claims data and is independent of any potential changes in the total quantity and composi-
tion of medical care over time. For the total quantity of medical services, I fix the price of
medical services at base year to (Pjto) and allow the quantity and composition of medical
service (RV Uijt) to change over time. This quantity measure could be interpreted as a
dollarized amount of medical services received per patient. For simplicity, I will refer to
this quantity measure as the total RVUs in later sections.
To investigate the effects of physicals payments on the composition of medical care




βt1t + αXit + θInterimt + εit (1.3)
where i is the index of distinct medical treatment episodes for injured workers,
t is the index of time (measured by the year of the first claim) and βt is the year fixed
19 For medical services performed in facility, I also include hospitals costs for those medical service. I
calculate the average cost for each medical service from the institutional claims data and convert that cost in
dollars to RVUs.
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effects. Year 2007 is omitted. Interimt is an indicator for workers who started treatment
from December 1, 2007 to February 29, 2008, to allow the possibility that they are partly
affected by the policy change during the course of treatment. Xit is a set of individual-level
control variables, including the patient’s age, gender, county of residence, and whether
his or her first visit was to an emergency department. Yit is the outcomes variable of
interest, the average payment per patient or the total RUVs per patient per episode defined
previously.20 The key parameter of interest is βt, which can be interpreted as the change in
the costs paid or the quantity of care received by injured workers due to the administrative
increase in reimbursement policy.




βt1tFacilityp + αt1t + θj1j + δsFacilityp + εjpt (1.4)
where t is the index of time (measured by year), j represents the type of ser-
vices, and p is the index for locations of care (in a hospital setting or in an office setting).
Facilitys is an indicator for services performed in a hospital setting, αt is the year fixed
effects, θj is service fixed effects, and βt is the set coefficients for interaction terms be-
tween the facility dummy and year dummies. Year 2007 is omitted. The main analysis
uses the log of total number of surgical services per patient as Zjpt.21 The key parameter
of interest is βt, which can be interpreted as the difference in the outcome variable over
20 I limit the quantity of medical services to the first three months of each episode to avoid possible
truncation problems for medical treatment.
21 I scale this measure to the total number of medical services per 100,000 patients when using log as the
outcome variables to avoid dealing with very small numbers.
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time in a hospital setting versus in an office setting. If the identification assumption holds
and the policy change is exogenous, estimates of βt for time periods before 2008 should
be small and insignificant. The estimates of βt after year 2008 would show us the sub-
stitution of surgical services between hospital and office. If physicians respond to higher
payment by providing more care in a hospital setting, we would see more surgical services
performed in a hospital setting after 2008, compared to surgical services performed in an
office setting.
The specification in equation 1.3 does not account for potential changes in the
mixes of the types of medical services received by injured workers over time. The al-
ternative within-service comparison specification allows me to compare the quantity of
medical care within service by including service fixed effects and explore heterogeneity
across different types of medical services.
1.4.2 Identification
This paper takes advantage of an administrative change in maximum allowed reim-
bursement rates for certain types of medical services in March 2008. For the identification
to be valid, the change in regulations on reimbursement has to be orthogonal to other fac-
tors that could potentially affect supply of medical care. Specifically, workers who started
their worker compensation claims before or after the policy change should be otherwise
similar in their characteristics and medical treatment.22
22 One might be concerned that workers who are covered by Workers’ Compensation insurance or claim
medical benefits could change in response to the increase in maximum allowed reimbursement rates. This
is unlikely for the following reasons. First, TDI regulates premiums of Workers’ Compensation insurance
and the major inputs for premiums is industry-specific risks and employer-specific past claiming history.
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One might worry about the characteristics of workers who claim workers com-
pensation medical benefits are affected by the changes in payment for medical services.
On-the-job illnesses and injuries, which probably resulted from the nature of work and
random accidents, are likely to be orthogonal to reimbursement for medical services. It
unlikely that workers would change their behaviors of claiming workers compensation
because of reimbursement received by physicians. Nevertheless, I check on the composi-
tion of employees entering workers compensation in table 1.5.23 In the top panel of table
1.5, I aggregate data to the year-month level using the date of first claim for workers, and
regress a linear trend, an indicator for after March 1, 2008, and the interaction term on
outcome variable, including the total number of workers, the log total number of workers,
and the median age of workers. In the bottom panel of table 1.5, data is aggregated to the
year-month-county level and run a similar regression with county fixed effects. Both set of
results show that the outcomes variables do not have different trend for post- policy time
periods.
In addition, in figure A.1 in the appendix, I show the fraction of place of service
(office, emergency department, inpatient, or outpatient) for patients’ first visits in figure
The increase in payment to physicians are unlikely to enter into the calculations. Second, TDI updates
premiums every year with a lag of at least three years to reflect the past costs of income benefits and medical
benefits. If medical costs increased as a result of this policy change, it is not immediately reflected in
Workers’ Compensation insurance premiums. Third, medical benefits are fully covered under Workers’
Compensation for work-related injuries. Workers covered by Workers’ Compensation experience no change
in price for claiming medical benefits.
23 For each patient, I first identify the date of his or her earliest claim. Since data available starts only
from January 1, 2005, I excluded workers whose earliest claims are within the range of January 1, 2006 to
June 31, 2005 to make sure the earliest medical claims we observe are likely to be the first medical claims
made by workers. I excluded workers whose earliest medical claims are within the range of July 1, 2012 to
December 31, 2012, due to the possibility of updates in claim-level data afterwards.
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A.1 (a) and the distribution of the main diagnosis for patients in figure A.1 (b) over time.
It shows that the distribution of place of services and main diagnosis are relatively stable
over time, indicating patients’ medical conditions or choices of place for first visits do not
changing over time.
Another way to check if the identification assumption holds is by examining the
pre-policy year fixed-effects in the estimation results. As shown in section 1.5, all of the
estimated pre-policy year fixed effects are insignificant, suggesting that there is no other
confounding factors or trends.
1.4.3 First-Stage Effects
I first show the first-stage effect of the policy change on the average payment of
surgical services per patient. I estimate the specification in equation 1.3 using the average
costs of surgical services per patient previously defined as the outcome variable. Figure 1.1
shows that it takes a year for the average payment to respond and averaging the increase
in the last three years, the average payment per patient increased by 12%. It took about
a year for the increase in payment to reach 8%, and the change persists at that level until
2012. Since insurers typically negotiate rates with providers on an annual basis and might
need some time to adjust, the gradual change in average payment is not surprising.24
24 The actual increase in payment is smaller than the policy change in maximum allowed reimbursement
rates. This means that the administrative increase in maximum allowed reimbursement rates for medical care
is not fully transferred to providers. This partial transfer can be due to a few reasons. First, in healthcare
networks within the Texas Workers’ Compensation system or other agreements, insurers could pay lower
than the maximum allowed amount. The maximum reimbursement amount regulated by TDI is only binding
if there are no contracts or agreements between insurers and physicians. In healthcare networks or other
agreements, insurers could negotiate for lower reimbursement rates and do not necessarily have to pass on
the increase in maximum allowed reimbursement rates fully to providers. Second, it is possible that some
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1.5 Estimation Results
This section presents the estimation results. To explore possible substitution be-
tween locations of care, I start by analyzing the changes in total RUVs for surgical services
in a hospital setting and in an office setting. I then examine the possible spillover effects
on nonsurgical services and provide evidence of complementariness between surgical and
nonsurgical services. Additionally, I explore heterogeneity by looking at different types of
services and elective services.
1.5.1 Baseline Estimates
To understand the effects of payment changes on the composition of medical ser-
vice across locations of care, I examine the total RVUs for surgical services in a hospital
setting and in an office setting per patient.25 I estimate the specification in equation 1.3
and look at the total RVUs for surgical services in a hospital setting and in an office setting
per patient.
For the total RVUs of surgical service per patient, figure 1.4 shows a 2% increase
in the total RVUs of surgical services in a hospital setting. However, this increase is fully
offset by the reduction in the total RVUs of surgical service in an office setting. As a
result, the total RVUs of surgical services did not change. I also find similar results for
services are bundled together for payments. On average, the reimbursement paid for surgical services in
facility may not fully reflect the change in policy. Third, rejections or disputes of claims could reduce the
actual amount providers receive on average.
25 As shown in figure A.2, about 77% of treatment are completed within three months. The distribution
of duration of treatment has a long right tail, with roughly 10% of workers having a duration longer than
10 months. Based on the distribution for duration of treatment, to minimize the problem with truncation on
duration of treatment, I will look at outcomes at work level within three months of treatment in the following
sections. This allows us to analyze outcomes for workers in a comparable way without losing too much data.
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the extensive margin. Figure 1.3 shows that there is a 1 percentage point increase in the
probability of having any surgical services in facility settings, while the probability of
having any surgical services stays unchanged. This indicates that the location of surgical
services is highly responsive to the payment variations between hospital and office settings.
As a robustness check, I explore the substitution between locations of care further
using within-service comparison and controlling for service fixed effects. Focusing on
the set of surgical services that could potentially be performed in both hospital and office
settings, figure 1.6 presents estimates from equation 1.4 using the log of the total number
of surgical services per patient as the outcome variable. Before 2008, the estimates are
insignificant and close to zero, indicating an absence of differential trends for surgical
services in facility and nonfacility settings. The estimated coefficient of year 2008 is small,
possibly because the year 2008 is partially affected by the policy change. The increase in
relative quantity of surgical services in facility versus nonfacility increased by roughly
14% in 2009. For the next three years (from 2010 to 2012), the effect is much larger and
is about 35%.
I also estimate an alternative specification using a simple POST indicator to show
the average effect for post-policy period. Table 1.8 shows that on average, the total number
of surgical services increases in facility settings by 23.1% compared to that in nonfacility
settings, while the relative average payment increased by 15%. Alternatively, if we focus
on the last three years and take these estimates as long-run effects, from table 1.7 we have
a larger effect of 35.5%.26
26 If we take into account the estimated changes in relative payment for surgical services, the implied
elasticity is about 2.07 (=35.5%/17.1%). As the total RVUs of surgical services per patient did not change
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In addition, I find that the substitution between locations of care is present across
the spectrum of surgical services, and it is not driven solely by the medical services initially
with a low fraction performed in a hospital settings. I show the share of surgical services
performed in facility settings over time in figure 1.7 (a). The share in facility is stable at the
level of 47.5% before 2008. Then we observe an increase in the share in facility in 2008
and 2009, and an almost flat level of 56% from 2010 to 2012. This pattern is consistent
with the estimated effects shown previously. Then I group surgical services based on the
fraction performed in facility before 2008 into four categories using quartiles, as a measure
of “facility intensity”. Quartile 1 (Q1) includes the services with the lowest fraction in
facility, while quartile 4 (Q4) has the highest fraction in facility. Figure 1.7 (b) shows the
share in facility over time for each category. For all four categories, the share in facility
has increased after the policy change for surgical services. This further confirms that the
increase in surgical services in facility holds for medical procedures with different levels
of “facility intensity”.
1.5.2 Nonsurgical Services
Although nonsurgical services are not directly affected by the payment change, it
is possible to observe changes in the quantity and composition of nonsurgical services, as
nonsurgical services are likely to be complements to surgical services in the provision of
medical care. For example, additional office visits are likely to be necessary when surgical
services are provided. To examine potential spillover effects on nonsurgical services, I es-
timate the specification in equation 1.3 and look at the total RVUs for nonsurgical services
over time, we can interpret this elasticity as the elasticity of substitution between hospital and office settings.
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in a hospital setting and in an office setting per patient.
Figure 1.3 shows that the RVUs of nonsurgical services increased by about 4%,
and the increase mostly comes from the increase in the total RVUs of nonsurgical services
in a hospital setting. Combined with the increase in the total RVUs of surgical services in a
hospital setting, the results suggest that nonsurgical services are likely to be complements
to surgical services.
The most possible reason for the complementarity between surgical services and
nonsurgical services is bundled treatment. Patients might need to undergo many nonsurgi-
cal services for diagnostic or preparatory purposes before having a surgery. For example,
for medical claims with at least one surgical service in a facility submitted in 2007, on
average 28.32% of medical services are nonsurgical services.
I explore this possibility further by providing additional evidence supporting this
argument. First, I take the nonsurgical services for patients who had at least one surgi-
cal service within two weeks, and show the change in total number of services for this
subsample of nonsurgical services in figure 1.10 (a). The intuition here is to focus on non-
surgical services performed on the patients with possibly related surgical services, which
are affected by the change in reimbursement rate. The estimated effect on this subsample
is very similar to that from the overall sample.
Second, I restrict the sample to nonsurgical services which are typically performed
within a short period of time of some surgical services. Using data before 2008, I first cal-
culate the median of the number of days between the date of service of each nonsurgical
service and the date when the closest surgical service performed. If the number of days
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apart is small for a certain nonsurgical service, then this nonsurgical service is likely to be
related to some surgical services. Among all nonsurgical services, the median is roughly
20 days. So I estimate the same specification in equation 1.4 using a subsample of non-
surgical services which are typically performed within 20 days of surgical services, with
estimates plotted in figure 1.10 (b). Again, the estimated effect on this subsample is very
similar to that from the overall sample, with possibly larger magnitudes for estimates in
post-policy period.
1.5.3 Heterogeneity
Medical services vary in many dimensions, such as cost, risk, and intensity. In this
section, I explore the heterogeneity of the estimated effects among surgical and nonsurgi-
cal services.
First, I group surgical and nonsurgical services based on the types using the Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) service categories. Table 1.9 shows that the changes
in relative quantity is significant across all types of surgical services. The estimated ef-
fect is 26% for integumentary system services, 17% for musculoskeletal surgeries, and
44% for nervous system services.27 For nonsurgical services, table 1.10 shows that the
estimated increase in nonsurgical services in facility settings versus nonfacility settings
is driven mostly by evaluation and management (E&M), anesthesia and radiology, which
are the types of services one would expect to be performed along with surgical services.
The estimated effects on pathology&lab, medicine, and device and equipment (D&E) are
27 The first-stage effects on actual payment to providers vary by type of procedures as well, with larger
changes for musculoskeletal surgery and nervous system services. Taking into account the first-stage esti-
mates, the implied elasticity is larger for integumentary system and nervous system services.
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insignificant.
Second, I also explore whether the response is more pronounced for elective sur-
gical services. It is possible that physicians could change the options of medical treatment
more easily for non-urgent and discretionary medical care. Figure 1.8 shows the effect
on quantity for surgical services that are deferrable and non-deferrable medical services,
respectively.28 Deferrable medical service could be considered as relatively more discre-
tionary. The estimates for deferrable services are close to the baseline results with slightly
larger magnitude from 2010 to 2012, and small and nonsignificant for non-deferrable med-
ical services.
Third, since the costs of healthcare vary substantially by geographic areas (Fisher
et al., 2009), to explore possible differential effects across areas, I conduct the same anal-
ysis following equation 1.4 by hospital referral regions (HRR) in Texas - Houston, Fort
Worth, San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin. As shown in table 1.11, the results are roughly
similar to baseline estimates. The estimates are slightly larger for Houston and Dallas,
which are both metropolitan areas with large manufacturing sectors, such as communica-
tions equipment, and oil and gas extraction (Assanie et al., 2007).
1.5.4 Discussion
Taken all together, patients received more care after 2008 when the reimbursement
rates increased for surgical services in facility. Figure 1.2 shows the total RVUs of services
increases by roughly 4.5%, averaging the estimates for the last three years. The increase
28 See appendix A.1 for the definition of deferrable and non-deferrable medical services.
24
in total RVUs mostly comes from the increase in nonsurgical services.29 With a 6% first-
stage effect on the total costs per patient, the implied supplied elasticity is about 0.75.
This small positive price elasticity of supply of medical care supports the upward-sloping
supply curve.
For cost-benefit analysis of medical payment changes, the findings in this paper
highlight the importance to consider possible substitution between locations of care and
spillover effects for the impact on total medical spending. For the policy change studied
in this paper, taking the first-stage increase in the average cost per patient, total costs per
patient will increase by 6%, assuming there is no change in the provision of medical ser-
vices by physicians. Adding the estimated effects on the total quantity of medical service
per patient, this would translate to a 10.5% increase in average cost per patient. If we
further include the additional payments to hospitals or other healthcare facilities due to the
increase in medical services in a facility setting, the increase in medical spending would
be even higher. Failing to consider the changes in total quantity and composition of care
would lead to underestimation of the increase in medical spending.30
29 The effects on the total quantity of medical services lags one year behind the effects on payment
change. One possible reason is that physicians typically discuss medical treatment strategy and medical fee
schedules annually. It is possible that physicians are not immediately fully aware of the payment changes and
do not change their treatment choices at the same time. Additionally, it might be easier to change medical
treatment and maximum profits for new patients, compared to existing patients.
30 The analysis in this paper does not incorporate potential benefits to workers, such as higher quality of
care and more effective medical treatment, when medical payments to physicians increase. It is possible that
the increase in payment for surgical services in facility settings increased the duration of treatment, which in
turn increased the days away from work, simply due to the fact that workers received more medical treatment
or need additional time for physical therapy. On the other hand, if better medical services are provided for
treating injuries, it could help shorten the course of treatment and days away from work. Unfortunately, with
limited data availability, we could not directly evaluate the health outcomes for workers, such as physical
functions post-injury and days away from work. The increase in follow-up visits and referrals to specialists
indicates that access to healthcare for injured workers could have improved. Using the tabulated data on
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The strong substitution documented in this paper also confirms the recent concerns
on the differential payments across locations settings (MedPAC, 2013). If payment varia-
tions across location settings induce services to migrate from physicians’ offices to higher
paid hospital settings, hospitals could have incentives to acquire private practices and har-
vest higher payment from insures or government for the same medical services.31 In the
case of Medicare and private health insurance, the differential charges across settings could
also impact cost-sharing for the insured patients.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the impact of financial incentives on the quan-
tity and composition of medical care provided by physicians. Using a sharp increase in
the maximum allowed reimbursement rates for surgical services performed in a hospital
setting for Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims, I document evidence of strong
substitution in the location of care. I find that the 2% increase in surgical services provided
in a hospital setting in response to this reform is fully offset by reduced utilization in an
office setting. I also find that non-surgical services performed in a hospital increased in
response to the reform, suggesting surgical and nonsurgical services are complements with
Nonfatal Occupational Injury and Illness Data for Texas from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for the time
period studied in this paper, the median days away from work remains constant for minor injuries, such as
sprains/strains, bruises/contusions, and cut/lacerations. However, for multiple traumatic injuries, the median
days away from work decreased from an average of 15 days before policy change to 11 days afterwards.
It is possible that with more medical services, workers with severe and complicated injuries recover more
quickly.
31 According to the American Hospital Association annual survey of hospitals, the number of physicians
and dentists employed by hospital was relatively constant between 1998 to 2003 but grew by 55% from 2003
to 2011.
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respect to physician financial incentives. Overall, my results also highlight the importance
of accounting for the complements and substitutes of the category of care for which the
payment changed for evaluation of medical payment reform.
The findings of this paper are directly relevant for the regulations on the reimburse-
ment rates in Workers’ Compensation system. Many states had explored or are currently
considering changes in reimbursement system to design payments better, and fee schedules
are the most widely used tools to regulate Workers’ Compensation medical payments.32
The findings should also be of interest to policymakers in other contexts, where there are
changes in medical payment for a subset of medical services. For example, the Affordable
Care Act increased medicaid payments to primary care physicians in 2013 and 2014. More
broadly, my results suggest that the location of care is responsive to financial incentives,
and optimal payment policy should account for substitution along this margin.
A natural step for future research is to explore further whether the differential fi-
nancial incentives across locations impacts other outcomes, such as hospital employment
of physicians, coordination of care across locations, and health outcomes for patients. It
would also be interesting to analyze this research question for different payers, especially
in the setting of Medicare and Medicaid, which are important sources of revenue for physi-
cians and hospitals.
32 For example, California enacted SB 863 in 2012, which required the Division of Workers’ Compen-
sation to transition the Official Medical Fee Schedule for physician services to a Medicare RBRVS system
over four years. At the end of the four years, the reimbursement rate will be 120% of 2012 Medicare rates.
California is currently exploring reforms for home health and ambulatory surgical services in workers’ com-
pensation as well (Wynn and Boustead, 2015; Wynn et al., 2014)
27

















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year 
Year FE 95% CI
Log of Average Payment for Surgical Services Per Patient
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.3. Data is aggregated to the patient level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. Year is based on the date of a
worker’s first claim. To ensure the accurate coding of date of first claims, employees with first claims from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2005 are excluded. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase
in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
county level based on employees’ places of residence. Outcome is the log of average payment per patient,
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year 
Year FE 95% CI
Log of Total RVUs Per Patient
(b)
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.3. Data is aggregated to the patient level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. Year is based on the date of a
worker’s first claim. To ensure the accurate coding of date of first claims, employees with first claims from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2005 are excluded. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in
maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at county
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year 
Year FE 95% CI
Any Nonsurgical Services in Facility
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.3. Data is aggregated to the patient level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. Year is based on the date of a
worker’s first claim. To ensure the accurate coding of date of first claims, employees with first claims from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2005 are excluded. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in
maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at county
level based on employees’ place of residence. This set of figures shows the changes in outcomes for each
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year 
Year FE 95% CI
Log of Total RVUs for Nonsurgical Services in NonFacility
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.3. Data is aggregated to the patient level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. Year is based on the date of a
worker’s first claim. To ensure the accurate coding of date of first claims, employees with first claims from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2005 are excluded. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in
maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at county
level based on employees’ places of residence. This set of figures shows that changes in outcomes for each
























Effects on Log of Average Payment Per Surgical Service
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the service level. The outcome variable is the average payment for surgical services
(in log). The estimates show the differences over time in average payment for surgical services performed















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Estimates 95% CI
Difference in # of Surgical Service between Facility and NonFacility
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the service level. The outcome variable is the total number of surgical services (in
log). The estimates show the differences over time in total number of procedures between surgical services
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
by quartile
Fraction of procedures performed in facility, surgical services
(b)
Notes: Figure (a) shows the share of procedures performed in a facility over time for surgical services.
Figure (b) shows the share of procedures performed in facility over time, by quartile of share in facility.
Quartile is defined using the share of procedures in facility in 2007: Q1 - 0 to 0.25, Q2 - 0.25 to 0.459; Q3 -
0.459 to 0.683; Q4 - 0.683 to 1. Higher quartile indicates that the surgical services are more like to be done















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Deferrable Non-Deferrable
Non-Deferrable Surgical Service Defined by Card-Dobkin-Maestas Test
Difference in # of Surgical Service between Facility and NonFacility
Notes: Note: This figure plots estimates of βt from equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the service level. The outcome variable is the total number of surgical services (in
log) for a subsample of elective procedures. Definition of elective procedures is from a t-test of equal
likelihood of weekday and weekend visits following Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009). Elective surgical
services are mostly major cardiovascular or orthopedic procedures, ambulatory procedures, minor skin or














2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Estimates 95% CI
Difference in # of Nonsurgical Service between Facility and NonFacility
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the service level. The outcome variable is the total number of nonsurgical services
(in log). The estimates show the differences over time in total number of procedures between nonsurgical
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Year
Subsample All
Facility vs. NonFacility, subset of workers who received surgical services













2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Subsample All
Facility vs. NonFacility, Nonsurgical services performed within 20 days of surgical services
Effects on Log of Total # of Nonsurgical Services
(b)
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.4 using subsamples of nonsurgical services
defined below. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical
claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in maximum
reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level.
The outcome variable is the total number of nonsurgical services (in log). The estimates show the differences
over time in total number of procedures between nonsurgical services performed in facility and those in
nonfacility settings. This set of figures explore the complementariness between surgical and nonsurgical
services. Figure (a) shows the change in total number of services for nonsurgical services with certain
surgical services during course of treatment for the same patients. Figure (b) shows the change in total
number of services for nonsurgical services that are performed within 20 days of certain surgical services.
See text in section 1.5.2 for more details. 37
1.7.2 Tables
Table 1.1: Share of Medical Claims by Location




Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) 18.30%
Emergency Room-Hospital 12.55%
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility 0.90%
Nonfacility
Office 52.20%
Home or Private Residence of Patient 19.82%
Health Clinic 10.23%
Independent Laboratory 5.85%
Urgent Care Facility 4.77%
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Note: This table shows the conversion factors (CF) for profes-
sional services for Texas Workers Compensation medical claims.
Before 2008, one conversion factor is applied to all type of ser-
vices. Starting from March 1, 2008, a separate conversion factor,
which is 25% higher than the standard level, is applied to surgical
services performed in facility settings.
Table 1.3: Example of Medical Services
HCPCS Description Avg Payment ($) % in Facility
Most Common Surgical Services
20610 Arthrocentesis, aspiration and/or injection, major joint 35.39 5.03%
12001 Simple repair of superficial wounds of scalp, neck, etc 83.57 42.99%
64483 Injection(s), anesthetic agent and/or steroid, epidural 277.95 62.89%
62311 Injection(s), of diagnostic or therapeutic substance(s) 233.46 54.99%
29881 Arthroscopy, knee, surgical; with meniscectomy 564.05 84.63%
Most Common NonSurgical Services
99213 Outpatient visit for evaluation and management 44.24 1.25%
97140 Manual therapy techniques (mobilization/manipulation) 17.58 0.28%
G0283 Electrical stimulation, to one or more areas 9.09 0.19%
72100 Radiologic examination, spine, lumbosacral 10.07 18.52%
85025 Blood count; Hgb, Hct, RBC, WBC and platelet count 10.68 51.97%
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.E.
Avg Number of Bills (each year) 2,898,938 176872.90
Avg Amount Paid per Bill ($) 231.12 10.81
Avg Amount Charged per Bill ($) 530.39 36.86
Avg Number of Workers (each year) 163,431
Avg Duration of Injury (in days) 123.70 255.97
Median Duration of Injury (in days) 26
Avg Costs Paid per Injury ($) 2779.67 9832.54
Avg RVUs per Injury 26.14 63.69
At Bill Line Level –
% Surgical Services 4.09%
% In Facility 57.80%
% In Non-Facility 42.20%
% Nonsurgical Services 95.91%
% In Facility 6.93%
% In Non-Facility 93.07%
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics using Texas Workers’ Compensation
medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. For duration of injury, to minimize the pos-
sibility of truncation, employees with first claims in 2005 and 2012 are excluded, and
employees with last claims later than June 30, 2012 are excluded as well. Statistics for
the bottom panel is from bill line level data sets.
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Table 1.5: Check on the Patients’ Characteristics
Check on the Characteristics of Worker Comp Patients
# of Workers Log # of Workers Median Age
Month Level
POST -35.695 -0.001 -0.040
(108.878) (0.056) (0.470)
POST*Trend -14.414 -0.001 0.020
(34.769) (0.002) (0.015)
Trend -33.371 -0.002 -0.004
(31.313) (0.002) (0.014)
N 84 84 84
Mean of Dep. Var. 19550.651 9.875 41.091
# of Workers Log # of Workers Median Age
County*Month Level
POST -0.411 -0.015 0.338
(2.239) (0.025) (0.320)
POST*Trend -0.062 -0.001 0.010
(0.075) (0.001) (0.009)
Trend -0.184* -0.002*** -0.006
(0.097) (0.001) (0.008)
N 12852 12852 12852
Mean of Dep. Var. 94.49 3.16 41.54
Note: This table shows the estimates of specification with a linear trend, post indicator
for after March 1, 2008, and the interaction term. In the top panel, data is aggregated
to the year-month level using the date of first claim for workers. And in the bottom
panel, data is aggregate to the year-month-county level and run a similar regression
with county fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01
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Facility*Y2005 0.036 0.088** 0.015
(0.041) (0.040) (0.031)
Facility*Y2006 -0.006 0.026 -0.011
(0.029) (0.028) (0.018)
Facility*Y2008 -0.003 -0.019 -0.006
(0.026) (0.026) (0.019)
Facility*Y2009 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.029
(0.035) (0.039) (0.025)
Facility*Y2010 0.360*** 0.405*** 0.121***
(0.058) (0.065) (0.032)
Facility*Y2011 0.335*** 0.352*** 0.133***
(0.068) (0.072) (0.041)
Facility*Y2012 0.371*** 0.343*** 0.088*
(0.077) (0.081) (0.047)
Year FE X X X
Service FE X X X
Facility FE X X X
N 3464 3464 2096
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.78 5.24 5.05
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of βt from equation 1.4. Data is ag-
gregated to the service-year level from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from
2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in maximum reimburse-
ment rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level.
This table reports estimates for log of average payment and log of total number of procedures,
separately for surgical and nonsurgical services. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p
<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.7: Effect on the Total Quantity of Medical Services (Short-/Long-term)













Facility*Y2005 0.019 0.036 0.027 0.015
(0.020) (0.041) (0.018) (0.031)
Facility*Y2006 -0.008 -0.006 0.025 -0.011
(0.017) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018)
Facility*Y2008-2009 0.131*** 0.068** 0.019 0.012
(0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021)
Facility*Y2010-2012 0.171*** 0.355*** 0.030 0.114***
(0.025) (0.064) (0.020) (0.038)
Year FE X X X X
Service FE X X X X
Facility FE X X X X
N 3464 3464 9680 9680
Mean of Dep. Var. 5.49 5.41 3.57 6.22
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of POSTt (an indicator for year at or after 2010)
and Facilitys, using specifications similar to equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to
zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the service level. This table reports estimates for log of average payment and log of total
number of procedures, separately for surgical and nonsurgical services. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
<0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.8: Effect on the Total Quantity of Medical Services (Post Period)













Facility*Post 0.151*** 0.231*** -0.021 0.72**
(0.020) (0.053) (0.017) (0.035)
Year FE X X X X
Service FE X X X X
Facility FE X X X X
N 3464 3464 9680 9680
Mean of Dep. Var 5.50 4.78 3.57 5.05
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of POSTt (an indicator for year at or after 2008)
and Facilitys, using specifications similar to equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. The increase in maximum
reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level.
This table reports estimates for the log of average payment and log of total number of procedures, separately
for surgical and nonsurgical services. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
44
Table 1.9: Effect on the Total Quantity of Surgical Services by Type
By AMA Service Categories
Surgical Services
Log of Total # of Procedures
Integumentary System Musculoskeletal Surgery Nervous System
Facility*Post 0.262*** 0.170** 0.442***
(0.067) (0.076) (0.122)
Year FE X X X
Service FE X X X
Facility FE X X X
N 616 1960 624
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.53 5.31 5.85
First-Stage Estimates 0.076** 0.162*** 0.183***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.061)
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of POSTt (an indicator for year at or after 2008)
and Facilitys, using specifications similar to equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. The increase in maximum
reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level.
Sample is restricted to surgical services, and each column is a separate regression on a subgroup of surgical
services, based on HCPCS codes classifications. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
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Table 1.10: Effect on the Total Quantity of Non-Surgical Services by Type
By AMA Service Categories
Non-Surgical Services
Log of Total # of Services
&Management
Evaluation




Facility*Post 0.585*** 0.601*** 0.117* -0.081 -0.046 -0.024
(0.122) (0.091) (0.061) (0.094) (0.121) (0.088)
Year FE X X X X X X
Service FE X X X X X X
Facility FE X X X X X X
N 560 472 1864 1824 1584 3376
Mean of Dep. Var. 6.58 5.09 5.43 5.15 5.50 4.32
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of POSTt (an indicator for year at or after 2008) and
Facilitys, using specifications similar to equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from Texas Workers’
Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on
March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level. Sample is restricted to surgical services,
and each column is a separate regression on a subgroup of surgical services, based on HCPCS codes classifications.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.11: Effect on the Total Quantity of Surgical Services by HRR
Log of Number of Surgical Services
Houston Dallas Fort Worth San Antonio Austin
Facility*Y2005 0.036 -0.083 -0.052 -0.147 -0.102
(0.028) (0.054) (0.081) (0.111) (0.086)
Facility*Y2006 0.009 -0.012 -0.033 -0.035 -0.023
(0.026) (0.049) (0.062) (0.066) (0.061)
Facility*Y2008 0.126*** 0.098* 0.043 -0.004 -0.136
(0.032) (0.051) (0.057) (0.061) (0.083)
Facility*Y2009 0.233*** 0.173*** 0.198*** 0.200* 0.100
(0.042) (0.053) (0.068) (0.103) (0.109)
Facility*Y2010 0.201*** 0.250*** 0.147 0.245** -0.046
(0.041) (0.059) (0.090) (0.116) (0.124)
Facility*Y2011 0.166*** 0.213*** 0.198* 0.194 0.012
(0.045) (0.080) (0.108) (0.126) (0.142)
Facility*Y2012 0.229*** 0.235*** 0.225* 0.179 0.113
(0.054) (0.081) (0.114) (0.156) (0.153)
Year FE X X X X X
Service FE X X X X X
Facility FE X X X X X
N 1600 1488 984 720 456
Mean of Dep. Var. 5.41 5.98 6.85 6.76 6.90
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of βt from equation 1.4, separately for each
hospital referral region (HRR) in Texas. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from Texas Work-
ers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero.
The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the service level. This table reports estimates for log of average payment and log of total
number of procedures, separately for surgical and nonsurgical services. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Chapter 2
Cash-on-Hand and Demand for Credit
2.1 Introduction
People often rely on finance services to smooth consumption and build assets to
cope with economic shocks and protect themselves against financial risks. Although many
households in the United States have substantial ability to borrow, for the individuals with
insufficient or inferior credit history, access to credit can be limited and costly.1
Researchers have long been aware of the importance of financial products in con-
sumption smoothing. A substantial group of population relies on borrowing in small dollar
credit to cope with the income shocks over payday cycles. This type of credit is very costly:
borrowers could pay about $15 for a $100 loan on a typical 14-day storefront payday loan,
equivalent to an annual percentage rate of charge (APR) of 391%.2 Despite these high
interest rates, about 15 million Americans used at least one payday loan at some time, and
payday lenders have more store locations in the United States than the popular fast-food
chain restaurant McDonald’s locations(Ackerman et al., 2012; Stegman, 2007; Karger,
1 Subprime borrowers typically have below-average credit scores and are charged with higher interest
rates for loans or credit cards. Subprime borrowers are often identified by having a FICO credit score below
640, and this threshold varies slightly by lender, across financial products, and over time.
2 This is a convenient way to compare the cost of short-term credit to other financial services, such
as credit card and auto loans. However, using APR to measure the cost of short-term credit might not be
entirely accurate. Some might argue it is not reasonable to compound the charges of short-term credit over
the period of a whole year.
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2005).
The literature have explored extensively the importance of liquidity and its impact
on various outcomes, such as education (Manoli and Turner, 2014), health (Gross and
Tobacman, 2014), mortality (Evans and Moore, 2012), consumption (Gruber, 1997) and
bankruptcy filings (Gross et al., 2014). Tax refunds or stimulus payment have been used
widely as sources of variation in income. In this paper, I extend this line of research
further by analyzing how tax rebates affect households’ financial situation, by looking at
the demand for the small dollar credit.
Borrowers in the small dollar credit market tend to have volatile income and un-
stable employment status. They could also be eligible for certain various kinds of public
assistance programs. As I will show in later sections, most of the borrowers are also eli-
gible for Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) benefits, and it is likely that some of the bor-
rowers are eligible for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamps,
or have household members who receive unemployment benefits or social security pay-
ments. Understanding how borrowing patterns change in response to tax rebates from
EITC would provide evidence on how the additional benefits from public programs help
with households’ financial situations.
Using unique loan-level data from a credit bureau that specializes in subprime
lending, I utilize variation in EITC generosity across state borders to examine the impact
of income shocks on the demand for credit. Combining with tax return data at the 5-digit
ZIP code level, I focus on ZIP code areas that belong to the same commuting zone, which
spans across state borders. I will show that residents in the same commuting zone share
similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The only significant difference
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in their income comes from the different generosity of state EITC benefits. Using the
commuting zone that spans the border of Texas and New Mexico as an example, Texas
does not offer any additional state EITC benefits, while New Mexico has an additional 10
% of federal EITC benefits. One might expect residents in New Mexico near the border
would borrow less as a result of the additional state EITC benefits. I use this plausibly
exogenous variation in EITC benefits to estimate the effect of tax rebates on the demand
for small dollar credit. The estimates can be interpreted as local average treatment effect
- the effect of having additional EITC benefits on borrowing for those who live in a state
with higher state EITC top-up rates.
The empirical results show that borrowers are quite sensitive to income shocks. A
$100 increase in EITC benefits leads to a 8.3% reduction in the number of loan applica-
tions and a 6.6% reduction in the number of borrowers. This could translate into sizable
reductions in loan volume and savings in financial charges. With $100 additional EITC
benefits, each borrower could save $13 on interest charges alone. The estimates are robust
to various specifications checks.
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, this paper builds
on a large literature that studies the effect of income shocks on consumption. Researchers
often study the sensitivity of consumption to income, using variation from tax rebates or
refunds (Bertrand and Morse, 2009; Gross and Tobacman, 2014), ending of mortgage or
car loan payments (Coulibaly and Li, 2006), or minimum wage hikes (Aaronson et al.,
2012). This paper adds to this line of literature by looking at the households’ debt. Al-
though consumption is central to testing the permanent income theory, it is also important
to know how debt changes in response to income in order to obtain a complete picture
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of households’ financial situations.3 Second, this paper provides a causal estimate of the
effect of tax rebates on the demand for small dollar credit. Third, the empirical results
also provide evidence on the benefit of EITC for reducing financial costs among the eligi-
ble population. With an imperfect credit market and limited access to traditional financial
products, the cost of borrowing could be substantially high. Borrowers could fail to pay
the fees and interest and get trapped in vicious borrowing cycles. Income benefits from
EITC and other public programs could help alleviate the financial burdens people face.
The results have several important implications on public policies and the credit
market. First, with frictions in the credit market, public programs, such as EITC, have
the additional benefit of reducing the use of costly credits and helping consumers smooth
consumption. In the absence of a fully functioning credit market, government programs
could act as insurance against adverse financial events. Second, the empirical results show
that demand for small dollar credit is quite sensitive to income shocks. Consumers signif-
icantly reduce their use of costly credit when cheaper liquidity is available, indicating that
EITC recipients might be liquidity constrained. Third, the analysis of this paper underlines
the importance of accurate measures of income in the credit market. Most lenders in the
sub-prime industry typically rely on self-reported income for underwriting, if there is any
underwriting at all. An accurate measure of income is critical to evaluate borrowers’ risk
and to reduce the default rate for lenders.4 Consumer advocates often argue that small dol-
3 Income and debt could be imperfect substitutes. One might expect marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) is different for income, compared to MPC for debt.
4 Most subprime consumers have multiple jobs. They have incentives to report their income strategically
to gain more access to credit and better loan terms. Common characteristics of subprime consumers include
limited or inferior credit history, volatile income or employment history, and facing relatively high financial
uncertainty.
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lar loans are too costly and should only be restricted to people who have the ability to pay.
Accurate income measures and elasticity of demand for credit to income shocks would
also be a key factor, when lenders build underwriting models and identify the population
with sufficient ability to pay.5
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the conceptual framework.
Section 2.3 describes the institutional setting explored in this paper. Section 2.4 discusses
the empirical strategy and identification assumptions. Section 2.5 describes the data. Sec-
tion 2.6 shows the empirical estimates of elasticity of demand for credit to income shocks,
placebo tests and robustness analysis. Finally, section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
There is a large literature on the importance of liquidity and its impact on various
outcomes, such as education (Manoli and Turner, 2014), health (Gross and Tobacman,
2014), mortality (Evans and Moore, 2012), consumption (Gruber, 1997) and bankruptcy
filings (Gross et al., 2014). Tax refunds or stimulus payment have been used widely as
a source of additional income. For example, Gross and Tobacman (2014) exploit the
randomized timing of one-time payment from the 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments, and
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) use tax rebates in tax year 2001 as the exogenous variations
in income. Researchers have used other variations in EITC benefits to study the impact
of liquidity on outcomes such as education attainment. For example, Michelmore (2013)
5 For example, CFPB is considering imposing regulations on rollover or renewal of payday loans at
national level, based on borrowers’ income or other characteristics (see proposal from CFPB). Pew insti-
tute has proposed a 5% loan-to-income ratio as the benchmark for underwriting (see details from the Pew
institute).
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use across-state and over time variations of EITC benefits to study the effects of income
on education attainment. LaLumia (2013) use the timing of EITC payment to study the
impact of EITC receipts on unemployment spells.
This paper adds to the literature by exploiting the cross-sectional differences in
state EITC benefits in a new way. The variations in income resulting from EITC benefits
are partly expected by eligible taxpayers and are not one-time payments. This supplements
the existing research which use temporary income shocks for one-time stimulus payments.
Before analyzing the effects of additional EITC benefits on the demand for small
dollar credits, we need to know how recipients typically use tax rebates or EITC refunds.
Barrow and McGranahan (2000) find that EITC receipts help low-income families pur-
chase big-ticket durable goods and smooth expenditure to some extent. Using the eco-
nomic stimulus payments of 2008, Parker et al. (2013) find similar results of substantial
consumption out of tax rebates. Agarwal et al. (2007) find that credit card borrowers re-
ceiving tax rebates had a large increase in credit card spending. Related to this paper’s
research question, Bertrand and Morse (2009) find a persistent decline in payday borrow-
ing in the pay cycles that follow the receipt of the 2008 tax rebate. Based on the evidence
in the existing literature, tax refunds are typically used for consumption, possibly the pur-
chase of large items or durable goods, or to pay off debts. 6
This paper expands the scope of outcomes in literature and looks at taxpayers’ fi-
nancial situation, focusing on the use of high-cost short-term payday loans. Short-term
6 These papers also highlight the importance of liquidity, especially for low-income families. Related
studies can also be found in sociology. For example, Sykes et al. (2015) offers detailed accounts of the use
of tax refunds through in-depth interviews.
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small dollar credit is typically not a substantial part of a household’s financial portfolio.
However, due to its high costs and short-term nature, use of these types of financial prod-
ucts could be viewed as an indicator of a deteriorating financial situation.
Another line of research related to this paper focuses on the consequences of pay-
day loans. Researchers have been long interested in quantifying the impact of payday
loans on consumers. Carrell and Zinman (2008) and Melzer (2011) both find that the use
of high-cost payday loans has a negative impact on borrowers. Evaluating the effects of
payday loans on consumers is beyond the scope of this paper. Based on the existing lit-
erature, we can interpret the reduction in the use of payday loans as an improvement of
households’ financial situation, which also indicates savings in fees and interest. I consider
the reduced demand for small dollar credit as beneficial to consumers financially, since the
interests and fees associated with this credit is avoided.
2.3 Background
2.3.1 Small Dollar Credit Industry
Small dollar credit offers short-term consumer loans of small amount, ranging from
$100 to $1,000. The most common type of small dollar credit is payday loans. Other types
of small dollar credit include installment loans, check cashing, rent-to-own, auto loans,
title loans, lines of credit, etc.
Consumers’ demand for small short-term consumer loans have long existed. The
payday loan industry has grown dramatically since its inception in the early 1990s. Stegman
(2007) estimated that payday loan volume expanded five times to almost $50 billion from
the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. According to Pew (2012), 12 million American house-
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holds borrow on payday loans each year, and a borrower on average takes out eight loans
of $375 each per year and spends $520 on interest. Payday loans are short-term loans for
immediate cash, typically secured by a borrower’s written check or authorization for auto-
matic withdrawal from the borrower’s bank account. Stephens Inc. estimates that payday
loan volume was roughly $45 billion in loan volume and $9 billion in revenue in 2014,
including both storefront and online lending. 7
In a typical payday loan transaction, the customer (borrower) writes a check for
the amount of the loan and finance charges. The creditor (lender) agrees to hold the check
until the next payday, typically about two weeks, when the customer redeems the check
with cash or the creditor deposits the check.8 On average, a consumer typically incurs $15
in fees on a $100 payday loan. Typical annual percentage rates (APR) for payday loans
range from 391% to 443%. They are called “payday loans” because they are marketed as
a tool for borrowers to make it to the next paycheck. Other similar financial products in
the small dollar industry are also tied to the date of the next paycheck, such as installments
and line of credit.
Since the loan comes due on payday, borrowers expect to have money in their
account to cover the check. Borrowers who do not have the funds to repay the loan and
meet other expenses must make one of three choices: (1) extend or rollover the loan,
(2) pay off the loan but borrow again from the payday lender immediately in a “back-to-
7 Full report is available from CFSA.
8 To get a loan, a borrower gives a payday lender a postdated check (e.g., dated on the borrower’s next
payday) and receives cash right away. The borrower will pay the full loan amount and fees on the next
payday. The lender then holds the check until the borrower’s next payday, which generally falls anywhere
from less than a week to a month later.
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back” transaction, or (3) default, and consequently incur bounced check fees by the payday
lender and insufficient fund (NSF) fees by the borrower’s bank while still owing the full
amount of the original post-dated check.9
Payday loan customers face limited credit availability and have fewer alternatives
than the average consumer. Nearly three-fourths of payday loan customers have been
turned down by a creditor or not given as much credit as applied for. Payday loan cus-
tomers were less likely than the general population to have a bank or retail credit card
(Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001).
2.3.2 Regulations
Consumer lending markets have been highly regulated, subject to usury laws and
small loan laws that limit interest rates and principal amounts, among other terms and con-
ditions. Among high credit-risk individuals, interest rate caps can be binding and lead to
credit rationing. Payday loan credit is regulated by state and federal laws.10 In addition,
many payday loan companies voluntarily adhere to a set of industry standards promul-
gated by an industry trade association, the Community Financial Services Association of
America (CFSA), as a form of self-regulation.
Payday loans are consumer loans and, therefore, are subject to the federal Truth
in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), which is implemented by the Federal Reserve
Board. Truth in Lending requires a detailed set of disclosures of the price and other terms
9 Lanning et al. (2014) document that the payday loans are often rolled over or followed by another loan
within 14 days.
10 See state-level regulations on payday loans at NCSL.
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of consumer credit transactions. The key price disclosures are the annual percentage rate
and the finance charge.11 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C.1692 et seq.)
establishes debt collection standards for third-party collectors. The act prohibits harass-
ment, false statements, and certain practices in collecting debts.
Thirty-two states have legislation or regulations explicitly authorizing payday loans.
Typically, the state payday loan laws exempt payday loans from usury or interest rate ceil-
ings, in exchange for establishing maximum fees and rollover limits. The state payday
loan laws also require licensing and periodic examinations to ensure that the licensees
are abiding by all applicable federal and state laws.12 Eighteen states and the District of
Columbia prohibit payday lending through strict interest rate ceilings, which make very
small loan sizes unprofitable.13
State laws also regulate nonprice terms of payday loan transactions in several ways.
Some laws limit the number of times an advance may be rolled over or refinanced. Eigh-
teen states (e.g., Colorado, Florida and Kansas) do not permit a payday loan customer to
11 The annual percentage rate is the periodic interest rate applied to outstanding balances multiplied by
the number of periods in a year. The finance charge is the total dollar amount of all interest payments.
Other disclosures for payday loan transactions include the amount of the loan (amount financed), the total
of payments (for payday loans, the check amount), and the schedule of payments.
12 Thirty-two states enacted safe harbor legislation for payday lenders and permit loans based on checks
written from consumers’ bank accounts at triple digit interest rates, or with no rate cap at all. These states
include: Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See statutes from NCSL for details.
13 In the online small dollar credit market, lenders can operate under two different legal models. They
can choose to obtain state licenses and comply with state level regulations, or they can choose to locate and
register their company at tribal areas or offshore locations and bypass any regulations. State licensed lenders
make up the most part of the industry. In the baseline analysis, I focus on state-licensed lenders and provide
results including offshore or tribal lenders as robustness checks.
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retire an existing advance with a new advance. Five states (e.g., Idaho and Illinois) permit
a current advance to be rolled over no more than three times. Many payday loan laws limit
the size of payday loans.14
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Overview
To identify the causal effect of income on demand for credit, one has to isolate ex-
ogenous shocks in income. Analysis using cross-sectional or time-series data alone could
be problematic and suffer from endogeneity problem. Indeed, using cross-sectional data,
I observe a positive correlation between the number of EITC recipients and the number
of borrowers in a subprime market. Figure B.1 shows borrowers of small dollar loans
and EITC benefits received across counties, respectively. It is obvious that there are more
borrowers and, at the same time, a higher amount of EITC benefits received in southwest-
ern areas. This pattern is not surprising given that EITC recipients and borrowers could
share common socioeconomic characteristics, such as education attaintment, income and
economic shocks. It highlights the importance of using exogenous variations for identifi-
cation.
To overcome the endogeneity problem, in this paper I exploit the different state
14 Size limits frequently range between $300 and $500 per advance. Some states directly limit the size of
the advance. Others limit the size of the check, which includes the amount of the advance plus the finance
charge. Montana has a variation on size limits that restricts advances to the lesser of $300 or 25% of the
customer’s net monthly income. Nevada limits the amount of the advance to one third of the customer’s
net monthly income. Many states also limit the aggregate amount of advances to a customer at a company,
which is generally the same as the size of the maximum advance. The intent of these restrictions on nonprice
terms is to force consumers to use payday loans for short-term needs and to keep the consumers from falling
too far into debt.
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EITC top-up rates for people living in the same commuting zone and close to state bor-
ders. Commuting zone is constructed to better delineate local economies and measure the
local labor market.15 People in the same commuting zone face the same labor market con-
ditions and experience the same economic shocks. Arguably, the only difference is that
households on one side of the state border could be eligible for additional EITC benefits,
typically measured as a percentage of the federal EITC benefits.
I assume that variations in income due to different generosity of state EITC benefits
are exogenous. Supporting evidence will be provided in later sections. Using American
Community Survey (ACS) summary files, I will show that demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics are not correlated with state EITC top-up rates. State level charac-
teristics, such as unemployment benefits, receipt of food stamp benefits, minimum wage,
and regulations in the small dollar credit market are not correlated with state EITC gen-
erosity either.
The estimates using the variations in EITC generosity across state borders could
be interpreted as the local average treatment effect on the population living close to state
borders where state EITC top-up rates vary.
2.4.2 Identification
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a federal tax credit for low- and moderate-
income working people. It encourages and rewards work as well as offsets federal payroll
and income taxes. States can choose to offer additional benefits on top of federal EITC
15 For more details on construction of commuting zones, see documentations from USDA.
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benefits. Twenty-six states, including the District of Columbia, have established their own
EITCs to supplement the federal credit.
In the 2012 tax year, about 26 million working families and individuals received the
EITC benefits. The amount of EITC depends on a recipient’s income, marital status, and
number of children. In the 2014 tax year, working families with children that had an annual
incomes below about $37,900 to $51,600 (depending on marital status and the number of
dependent children) may have been eligible for the federal EITC. Also, working-poor
people without children that have incomes below about $14,300 ($19,700 for a married
couple) can receive a very small amount of EITC.16
State EITC top rate ranges from 5% to 33% of federal EITC benefits. The eligibil-
ity requirements of state EITC benefits are identical to federal EITC. People who file both
state and federal tax returns would get both federal and state EITC benefits, if eligible.
In particular, most people use paid services (for example, H&R Block), when filing tax
returns. The paid tax preparation services have strong incentives to encourage people to
take up and file for both federal and state EITC benefits, if eligible.
Although the state EITC top-up rates are constant over time in most states, the
exact amount of the additional EITC benefits depends on a taxpayer’s income and could
be considered as random and exogenous income flows. This source of variation in income
is different from those used in previous research. For example, tax rebates are temporary
and one-time shocks. Though it is useful to study the short-term response to tax rebates,
people facing more permanent and longer term income shocks could behave differently.
16 For most updated information on eligibility and generosity of EITC, see details from IRS.
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Also, estimates using income shocks from EITC could be applied to other public programs
as well, such as unemployment insurance and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).
As described above, in this paper I exploit the cross-state variations in state EITC
top-up rates. Cross state variations alone are not enough to guarantee causal identification.
Residents in different states could be different in many dimensions, such as income, labor
market conditions, and economic shocks. To overcome this issue, I focus on commuting
zones (CZs) that span more than one states. CZs are larger than counties and are approx-
imately the size of 3-digit zip area (ZIP3): there are 709 CZs and about 913 ZIP3 areas
in the United States. Unlike counties or zip code areas, the commuting zones were first
developed by USDA Economic Research Service in the 1980s as a way to better delineate
local economies. County boundaries are not always adequate confines for a local economy
and often reflect political boundaries rather than an area’s local economy. CZs are geo-
graphic units of analysis intended to more closely reflect the local economy where people
live and work.17
2.4.3 Assumptions for Identification
The exogenous variation I use in EITC benefits arises from differences in state
EITC top up rates that occur at state boundaries. For this identification strategy to be
valid, within-CZ variation in EITC benefits only occurs at the state border - people living
in the same commuting zone are otherwise identical. One can also think of the exogenous
17 I use CZs updated in 2000 and a crosswalk between ZIP code areas and CZs to identify borrowers’
location from loan-level data.
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variations in state EITC benefits as an instrument for households’ income. For an instru-
ment to be valid, it has to be exogenous, that is, unrelated to other omitted factors that
might also affect the outcome variable, and be correlated with the variable it instruments
for (in this case, income levels).
Other factors of income shocks and borrowing behaviors could vary continuously
over geography as well. If these determinants are correlated with the instrument, state
EITC top-up rates, then the identification would not be valid. I address this concern by
providing a thorough analysis to support the identification assumption.
2.4.4 Estimating Equations
Given the cross-border variation in state EITC top-up rates, one way to estimate
the demand for credit is to run regressions of the number of loan applications on EITC
benefits received in the sample of cross-border CZs. However, this approach suffers from
an endogeneity problem, since the actual amount of benefits received depend on a tax
filer’s income, marital status, and number of dependents.
One approach is to use state EITC top-up rates as an instrument for actual benefits
received. In absence of any fraud in claiming EITC, this should be a valid strategy. To
facilitate the interpretation of the estimates in dollar terms, I follow the simulated instru-
ment approach (Currie and Gruber, 1996). I construct a cross-state simulated instrument
by calculating the eligible amount of EITC benefits using a constant, nationally represen-
tative sample for the US population. The simulated instrument isolates the variations from
the state level policy, and eliminates confounding factors, such as the demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics of residents across states.
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(2.1)
Given the constructed simulated instrument, the first stage regression is given by
the equation below. By construction, it should have a high value for R-squared and an
estimate of ρ close to one.
AvgEITCzt = ρSimEITCst + γc + θt + αXzt + ξzt (2.2)
whereXzt are local characteristics, γc are commuting zone fixed effects, θt are year
fixed effects, and ξzt is the error term. SimEITCst is the simulated instrument constructed
from above.
The reduced form is given by
Yzt = βSimEITCst + δc + ζt + ηXzt + εzt (2.3)
whereXzt are local characteristics, δc are commuting zone fixed effects, ζt are year
fixed effects, and εzt is the error term. SimEITCst is the simulated instrument constructed
from above.
To facilitate interpretation of the estimates, the following IV specification is esti-
mated:
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Yzt = φAvgEITCst + κc + σt + τXzt + νzt (2.4)
where Xzt are local characteristics, κc are commuting zone fixed effects, σt are
year fixed effects, and νzt is the error term. AvgEITCst is the actual amount of EITC
benefits received and will be instrumented using SimEITCst.
The key parameter of interest is φ, which can be interpreted as the effect of addi-
tional EITC benefits for people who are eligible and reside in states with generous EITC
benefits on borrowing decision. Yzt is some measure of demand, such as the total number
of borrowers, the total number of loans, and the total dollar amount of loans, either from
loan applications or funded loans. If Yzt is measured as total dollar of loans funded, the
coefficient can tell us the amount of loans in dollars that was replaced by $100 extra EITC
benefits. To control for differences in characteristics across commuting zones, I include
controls for income distribution, which is measured as the percentage of population with
income in certain range from IRS data, and for size of population in Xzt.
2.5 Data
Data for this project comes from multiple sources. The primary source for tax re-
turn data at the 5-digit ZIP code level come from the IRS and Brookings Institution.18 In
tax return data, for each ZIP5 area, the total number of tax return filers, the total num-
ber/amount of refunds, the number of federal EITC recipients and the total amount of
18 The Brookings Institution uses original aggregated level data from the IRS. The difference is that the
Brookings Institution re-assigned residence to more accurate and consistent ZIP code areas and counties.
Data from the Brookings Institution also includes some additional information on EITC-eligible tax filers.
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federal EITC benefits received is available in the tax return data.
Since the tax return data only includes federal tax filings, I assume that people who
file federal tax returns would also file state tax returns. This is a reasonable assumption
for the following reasons. First, a substantial part of the population eligible for EITC use
paid tax filing services, which would mostly likely assist taxpayers to file and claim any
refunds both at the federal and state level. Second, people using electronic tax filing would
file for both federal and state returns automatically.19 Third, taxpayers would have strong
incentives to file for both, if eligible for any public assistance.
The small dollar credit market, especially the online subprime lending market,
has grown dramatically in the last decade. Data on this type of high-interest lending are
typically proprietary and confidential. This paper takes advantage of a unique and new
dataset from a major credit bureau specializing in the online subprime lending market,
which has the most complete data coverage of United States, to my best knowledge. This
data set includes demographic and credit history information for loan applicants and loan
level characteristics from reporting lenders in this industry.
The loan level data includes both loan applications and funded loans from 2010
to 2014. In both applications and funded loan data, borrowers’ characteristics, such as
monthly income, date of next paycheck, pay frequency, data of birth and location of res-
idence (5-digit ZIP code) are available. For a subset of borrowers, I also observe their
housing status (own or rent), and occupation. Additional information is available on the
credit profile of borrowers, such as their bank account status, amount of loans in collec-
19 All states offer some form of e-filing options for taxpayers.
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tions or charged off, and bank account lifespan. Unique identification number for loan,
borrowers, and lenders is available in both data sets. This facilitates linking borrowers
across different loans and different lenders. For loan applications, the underwriting deci-
sion, approved/denied, is provided, if lenders host their underwriting decisions with the
credit bureau. For funded loans, I observe more information on the loans, such as loan
amount, fees charged, type of loans, and also loan performance.20
This proprietary data set has several advantages over the data used in previous
research. First, most papers on subprime lending use administrative data from one or a
few lenders. Loan data from the credit bureau has the most wide coverage and includes
many lenders in the industry. Second, lenders who report to the credit bureau also get
underwriting information in return. This allows me to observe some of the borrowers’
credit history measures. Third, this data is especially suited to study the online subprime
market, which has expanding substantially in recent years, yet is still not well understood.
There are several advantages of focusing on loans from the online credit market.
(1) Online credit is on average more expensive than the traditional storefront lenders. Peo-
ple who turn to online borrowing could be relatively more credit constrained. I will capture
the population who have a high demand for credit. (2) Another key advantage of focusing
on the online credit market is to avoid confounding factors from the supply side. People
in different locations basically have the same access to credit, regardless of their residen-
tial address and distance to locations of financial services. This allows me to ignore the
travelling distance to the physical lending sites. This helps with the identification strategy,
20 A comprehensive report of online small-dollar credit borrowers observed in data is available here.
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which relies on discontinuity in EITC generosity across state borders.
The payday loan application process does not involve a traditional credit check,
and payday borrowing activity is not reported to the national credit bureaus, Equifax, Ex-
perian, or TransUnion. This means that payday borrowing is not a factor that directly
affects one’s traditional credit score. Although some alternative credit data vendors (for
example, LexisNexis) cover this segment, it is not yet widely used for underwriting in
traditional financial products. Thus, usage of small dollar credit is unlikely to affect bor-
rowers’ subsequent access to credit from other sources.21
To supplement the analysis and provide evidence supporting identification assump-
tions, I also use the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the American Community Sur-
vey (ACS) summary files at 5-digit ZIP code level. For robustness checks, I uses data
on the on state level benefits of Food Stamps and unemployment benefits from various
sources, and the ZIP code Business Patterns (ZCBP) for storefront lending locations.
2.6 Estimation Results
2.6.1 Summary Statistics
Among all 709 commuting zones and roughly 42,000 ZIP 5-digit (ZIP5) code ar-
eas, I include only the ZIP code areas in commuting zones that span state borders. I further
impose two additional restrictions. First, only contiguous states with different state EITC
benefits are included for main analysis. There are cases where there is no differences in
21 If borrowers worry about the impact on credit scores when applying for payday loans, one might be
concerned that demand for small dollar credit could be correlated with the availability of other types of
liquidity from more traditional sources or demand for credit in the future, as credit score is often used for
underwriting for auto loans, mortgages etc.
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state EITC benefits across the border, for example, California and Nevada. These areas
won’t contribute to the key variations required for identification. However, I will use them
for placebo analysis later in the paper. Second, only states that allow payday loans are
included for analysis. For states that ban or strictly restrict payday loans, the online lend-
ing environment could be significantly different from the states where payday loans are
allowed and popular.22 It is more appropriate to consider these two different legal regimes
separately.
These sample restrictions are necessary to obtain valid estimates using the identifi-
cation strategy. It is also affect our interpretation of the findings. The population included
in the analysis is not representative of the general population as a whole. It is only for
a subset of states and for residents close to state borders. Thus, the results might not be
generalizable to the entire population.
The baseline analysis uses loan level data from state-licensed online lenders. I
will also show robustness analysis including offshore and tribal lenders as well, as part of
robustness checks.
In addition, throughout this paper, I will show results by further limiting the sam-
ple to 5-digit ZIP code areas where the centroid distance to the state border is less than
10 kilometers or 20 kilometers.23 Some commuting zones could be quite large in size.
22 Storefront lenders are only allowed to operate in states that allow payday loans. However, for online
lenders, there are two options. They can choose to be state-licensed and obey all state-level regulations. Or
lenders could be incorporated or registered in tribal or offshore areas, which would allow them to operate
even in states than ban payday loans. Due to the presence of tribal or offshore lenders, I observe loans
originated for borrowers living in states that ban payday loans in the dataset. Due to the presence of these
two types of lenders, we would expect the market conditions in states that ban payday loans to be very
different from the other states.
23 According to the distribution of distance to the closest state borders for 5-digit ZIP code areas, 10
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Restricting distance to border could provider a subsample where residents included for
analysis are more similar to each other. This also serves as a test on the sensitivity of
estimates. The downside of restricting distance to state borders is a smaller sample size
and thus less precise estimates.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the sample used for the regression analy-
sis. Similar to average statistics in this industry, the average loan amount is about $450, and
fees per $100 is about $26. 74% borrowers have a biweekly or semi-monthly pay-cycle,
which means the duration of loans is on average about 15 days. The median annualized
income for borrowers is around $30,000.
2.6.2 Check on Identification Assumptions
For the identification strategy to be valid, residents in the same commuting zone
should share similar characteristics and no other factors would change right at the state
border. Using summary files from the ACS data, I show that characteristics are balanced
at ZIP code level across borders in the same commuting zone. I run the same specification
as in equation 2.3 and replace the outcome variable as ZIP code level characteristics. De-
pendent variable include basic demographic characteristics, such as gender, race and age,
education attainment, socioeconomic characteristics, including labor force participation,
income and housing, and migration. As table 2.3 shows, none of the characteristics are
significantly correlated with state EITC generosity.
Other than the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, regulations in the
kilometers and 20 kilometers is about 25th percentile and median of the distribution, respectively.
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small dollar credit market could be different across states as well. Additionally, one might
also be concerned that people in different states might have different tax filing behaviors
or use of financial services. I provide additional checks on these characteristics in table
B.1 and B.2 in the appendix.
2.6.3 First Stage
Table 2.2 presents the estimates from the first stage as stated in equation 2.2. To
construct the outcome variable, federal and state EITC benefits, I assume that taxpayers
who are eligible and have claimed federal EITC benefits will also file for state EITC ben-
efits.
The variations in the simulated instrument are shown in figure 2.4. The difference
between neighboring states could be as large as $700.
As expected, the coefficient is close to one, which is not surprising given the simu-
lated instrument approach. R-squared is high (0.86) for the state level analysis, and lower
(about 0.4) for ZIP5 level. This makes sense since there would be more confounding fac-
tors at more detailed geographic levels (ZIP5 level), which leads to a lower value for the
R-squared.
2.6.4 IV Estimates
To facilitate an interpretation of the estimates, in this section I present the results
from IV specification in equation 2.4. The magnitude is very similar to the reduced form
results, as the first-stage estimates are close to one.
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2.6.4.1 Loan Applications
Loan applications are better measures for demand for credit, as applications are not
affected by lenders’ underwriting policy. It is possible that lenders target certain levels for
loan volume and revenues. If applications decreases in some geographic areas or during
certain time of the year, lenders could potentially change underwriting policies in response
to changes on the demand side.
I start with analysis using loan applications data first. Table 2.5 shows the estimates
from equation 2.4 using the simulated EITC benefits as an instrument for actual amount
of EITC benefits received. I show estimates using all ZIP5 areas in the CZs, and also
estimates when I restrict the sample to ZIP5 within 10 km or 20k m of state borders.
In table 2.5, the results imply that the effect of a $100 increase in income leads to an
8.3% reduction in loan volume, equivalent to a reduction of eight loan applications. It is
common for borrowers to apply for more than one loan annually, so I look at the number
of borrowers as the outcome as well. Results show that $100 additional EITC benefits
reduces 6.6% of borrowers on average (roughly four borrowers). In terms of elasticity,
a 10% increase change in EITC benefits leads to a 15.84% reduction in borrowers and a
19.42% reduction in loan applications, according to log-log specifications shown in table
2.6.
As a comparison, I also run the OLS regression using the actual amount of EITC
benefits received, and the results are in table 2.4. As discussed before, OLS estimation
suffers from bias due to common socioeconomic characteristics or economic shocks. One
might expect people who are eligible for more EITC refunds to be more liquidity con-
strained and more likely to borrow, indicating a positive correlation between EITC benefits
71
received and loan applications. From the results in table 2.4, the estimates are all positive,
as expected due to the direction of bias. The OLS estimates support the direction of bias,
and highlight the importance of using instruments for identification.
2.6.4.2 Originated Loans
Next I move on to the originated loans. Using originated loans adds to the results
from loan application data in two ways. First, originated loans allow me to observe loan
size, and analyze the effects on intensive margin as well. Second, one might worry about
lenders changing underwriting in response to the changes in loan applications. However,
the sample size for originated loan is smaller, which would possibly lead to larger standard
errors for the estimated effects.
Table 2.7 shows that $100 additional EITC benefits reduces the number of bor-
rowers by 7.4% on average. This estimate is close to the estimated effects using loan ap-
plications data. However, the total number of originated loans didn’t change much. This
implies that borrowers who were approved have slightly more loans on average. It could
be because people who still borrow in this market are relatively in need of more credit.
Alternatively, lenders might have relaxed their underwriting criterion and approved more
loans, given the reductions in volume of loan applications. Table 2.8 shows that the total
amount of loans reduced slightly, though the estimates are not significant. And average
credit per borrower might have increased, but the results on this is mixed.
In terms of dollars, given that on average each borrower receives $587 loans each
year, $100 EITC benefits will reduce demand for loans by roughly $36 (=$587*6.2%) for
each person.
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Then I look at the default rate among all originated loans.24 When interpreting the
estimated effects on the default rate, we need to keep in mind the caveat that the com-
position of borrowers could have changed as a results of the EITC benefits. On average,
lenders have a default rate of 26.3%. Table 2.9 shows that $100 additional EITC benefits
reduce the default rate by 1.5 percentage point for state-licensed lenders. This indicates
that borrowers with additional liquidity are more likely to pay off loans on time. It helps
to prevent borrowers from paying extra late fees or interest, and reduces loss for lenders
as well.
2.6.4.3 Discussion
Using log-log specification, we can estimate the elasticity of loan applications to
EITC benefits. From table 2.6, we have an estimate of -1.94, higher than one in the ab-
solute value. Using the estimates from originated loans in table 2.8, we have an elasticity
of -1.37 for the total amount of credit, though it is not precisely estimated. Overall, the
empirical estimates suggest that people are quite sensitive to income shocks.
Taking all results together, with additional income due to more generous EITC
benefits, we observe less people applying for loans and less number of loans originated. On
the other hand, the average amount of credit per borrower might have increased slightly.
It is possible that the marginal borrowers who could benefit from additional income are
more likely to be less risky and demand less credit in this market.
24 The measure of default here depends on lenders’ reporting. A caveat is that lenders could report




One might be interested in deriving the income elasticity of demand for credit
from the previous estimates. Although the elasticity estimated from the previous section
is informative to some extent, there are a few challenges to derive income elasticity from
these estimates. The difficulties come from inaccurate measures of total income and total
amount of credit. For example, income in credit bureau data is self-reported and is subject
to misreporting. The tax refund data is at aggregated level and income information could
be inaccurate for nonfilers and the self-employed population. Credit (or debt) is harder to
measure. Given the small loan size in the consumer credit market, even small measurement
errors could result in imprecise estimates.
Nevertheless, I proceed with some rough estimates of the the income elasticity of








Using the estimates from the previous section, we know that an additional $100
EITC benefits reduced loan amount applied roughly by $36. We can use 0.36 (=$36/$100)
as a proxy for the numerator of the elasticity. Using statistics from the Federal Reserve,
household debt service payments and financial obligations as a percentage of disposable
personal income is about 25.42%. If we use this ratio to approximate the debt-to-income
ratio, the income elasticity of demand for credit would be 1.42.
On Liquidity Constraints
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The estimates provide some suggestive evidence on whether EITC recipients are
liquidity constraint. Without any liquidity constraint and any frictions in credit market,
individuals would choose the optimal consumption and debt (or savings) to maximize
their utility over lifetime. In this case, if their income changes temporarily, individuals
would smooth consumption by spreading out the transitory changes in income over time,
according to the permanent income hypothesis. Individuals would also have no incentives
to change their financial portfolio, as spending using credit cards or the additional income
is equivalent.
However, this paper finds that use of small dollar credit reduces significantly when
additional income is available. This finding suggests that individuals face high costs when
borrowing and EITC recipients face imperfect capital market.
On Savings of Financial Costs
Reduction in use of small dollar credit could save individuals financial charges,
including interest, late fees, and possible roll-over charges. If loan amount is reduced by
$50 for an additional $100 EITC benefits, using a average fee of $26 per $100 loan, each
individual would save $13 on interest fee alone. Since the default rate is also reduced,
adding the potential savings on late fees, the savings on financial costs would be larger.
2.6.5 Robustness Checks
As a placebo test, I implement a permutation test by randomly assigning state EITC
generosity. For all the states that allow payday loans, I assign each state a random draw
from the distribution of the simulated instrument constructed using equation 2.1 and run
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the same specification using this randomly assigned instrument. I repeat this 2000 times.
The distribution of t-statistics of this exercise is shown in figure 2.5. It is close to a normal
distribution. The true estimates in the previous section is significant at 5% level in this
empirical distribution.
I also run several robustness checks to show that the estimates in this paper are not
sensitive to additional controls or alternative specifications.
First, as state policies or other state-level factors might be correlated with the cross-
sectional differences in state EITC top-up rates, I include several additional state level
controls, such as minimum wage, SNAP benefits and unemployment benefits. The results
are in the top panel of table 2.10. Overall, the magnitude of the estimates do not vary much
when additional state level controls are included. This helps to mitigate concerns on the
possibility that state level factors or policy could be correlated with the estimated effects.
Second, I also control for the number of storefront lending sites at the ZIP code
level. As described above, this paper uses data from the online small dollar credit market.
Storefront lending still dominates this industry. The density of stores could vary geograph-
ically and affect consumers’ demand for credit online. I construct a measure of number of
stores at ZIP code level from the ZIP code Business Patterns (ZCBP) data and add it to the
regression as additional controls. The results are in the bottom panel of table 2.10. Again,
the estimates are not much different from the baseline results.
Third, I vary the restriction on distance to state borders and zoom in/out the dis-
tance to show that the estimates are robust to this sample restriction in table 2.11. The
trade-off is that we have less precise estimates and smaller cell size when zooming in
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on areas closer to state borders. This set of results serves as an additional check on the
sensitivity of estimated effects.
2.6.6 Limitation
There are a few limitations to this study. (1) Though small dollar credit is costly
and hotly debated in policies, it is still a relatively small part of household debt. Results
on applications for small dollar credit might not be informative about the overall debt for
an average household in the U.S.. People might use small dollar credit as a last resort. In
this regard, reductions in demand for this type of costly credit might indicate that people
move away from the worst financial situations.
(2) The analysis in this paper relies on the comparison among people living in the
same commuting zone close to state borders. It is possible that areas close to state border
are more likely to be rural and could be different from the overall population. Thus the
results on this specific population might not be applicable to the wider population.
(3) Variations used for identification in this paper come from EITC. As an im-
portant refundable tax credit for working people with low to moderate income, EITC is
widely known to the eligible population and has affected a wide range of outcomes, as well
studied in the literature. Other income shocks, such as stimulus payments or one-time tax
rebates, might induce different responses.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the effect of income shocks on demand for small
dollar credit. Using variations in the state EITC top-up rates and focusing on areas near
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state borders within the same commuting zone, I find that borrowers are very sensitive to
changes in income. Preferred estimates suggest the elasticity is about -1.5 to -2. In terms
of dollar values, it translates to sizable reductions in loan volume and savings in fees and
interest charges. The estimates are robust to various alternative specifications and sample
restrictions.
The empirical results also suggest that EITC benefits could help alleviate people’s
financial burdens by providing cheap liquidity. Other public programs with income bene-
fits (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) could also benefit their recipients in a similar
way by offering alternative options to satisfy their short-term liquidity needs. For house-
holds with volatile income flows and facing frequent economic shocks, this benefit could
be crucial and lead to long-term financial stability. In this respect, public programs could
partly play the role of financial services in presence of credit market frictions.
One can also think about how to design pay cycles to better address the need of
short-term liquidity (Parsons and Van Wesep, 2013). Employers could also step in and
help workers gain access to cheaper credit over the pay cycle. For example, employers can
offer flexible paycheck schedules or financial products similar to payday loans but with
lower costs.25 Similar ideas can be applied to public policies with transfer payment. For
example, in early stages of EITC implementation, policy makers have proposed offering
installment option to tax payers (Holt et al., 2009).
With the recent growing trends in the small dollar financial product, it is clear
that households do have a high demand for short-term financial products. For the financial
25 Many online lenders offer flexible term repayment loans in the UK. Employers, for example, like
Wal-Mart, could offer flexible timing for employees’ paychecks.
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industry, the results presented in this paper indicate that income could be an essential factor
that affects borrowers’ demand and ability to pay. Lenders might want to emphasize the
role of income when building underwriting models and designing new financial products.
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This figure shows the eligibility and generosity of federal EITC benefits in 2011, by filing status




Notes: This map shows the states included for analysis. States with red dots are the states which do not
offer additional state level EITC benefits. States in the blue plaid pattern are the states that offer some
additional state level EITC benefits. The border areas among these two types of states provide variations
for identification. States that do not allow payday loans or offer nonrefundable state EITC benefits are
excluded. Border areas with the same state EITC top-up rates, for example, CA and AZ, do not contribute
to identification in the baseline estimates, but will be used for placebo and robustness analysis.
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Figure 2.3
Notes: This figure provides a specific example on the identification strategy.
ZIP5 areas on this map are located in two different states, New Mexico and
Texas, but all belong to the same commuting zone. New Mexico offers 5%
additional EITC benefits, while Texas does not offer any additional benefits.
Assuming people in these areas are similar in demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics, those in New Mexico would have additional income
compared to the others. Using this variation in income due to state EITC
policy, I analyze whether people in New Mexico would have less demand
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Differences in Simulated Average EITC Benefits Per Recipient
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of simulated EITC benefits. Average EITC benefits includes both
federal and state EITC in TY2011, using simulated instrument constructed from CPS data. States with
nonrefundable EITC are excluded. This histogram uses ZIP5 areas in states that allow payday loans and in
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by randomly assigning simulated EITC benefits
Distribution of t-statistics from permutation test
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of t-statistics from a permutation test by randomly assigning gen-
erosity of state EITC benefits. For all the states that allow payday loans, I assigned each state a random draw
from the distribution of the simulated instrument and run the reduced-form specification using this randomly
assigned instrument and I repeated this process 2000 times.
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2.8.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Loans
Average $ Loan Amount $446.90
Average $ Loan Fees Per $100 $26.60
Average Duration of Loans (in days) 15.68
Borrowers
Median Age 40
Median Annual Income $30K
Average $ Borrowed $587.35
Pay Frequency
Weekly 10%
Biweekly or Semi-monthly 74%
Monthly 16%
Note: This table shows the summary statistics on borrowers and loans observed in loan-level data.
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Table 2.2: First Stage
First Stage - Simulated $EITC on Actual $EITC Received
State level ZIP5 level
Dep. Var. -Avg $EITC Received 10 km 20 km all
Simulated Average $EITC 1.114*** 1.079*** 1.090*** 0.992***
(0.069) (0.097) (0.082) (0.037)
Mean of Dep. Var 23.39 22.45 22.44 22.40
N 108 6919 12772 67422
R-squared 0.86 0.38 0.37 0.39
Note: The table shows the estimates of the effects of the simulated average EITC benefits per recipient on the
actual EITC benefits received across states or ZIP5 areas. EITC benefits include both federal and state EITC.
The federal EITC benefits received are from IRS tax return data, and state EITC benefits are calculated using the
state EITC top-up rate, assuming full take-up among federal EITC filers. Regressions also include year FE (tax
year 2009 - 2012), and census region FE. In total, 27 states that have refundable EITC and allow payday loan are
included in the analysis (see map in figure 2.2). * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
86
Table 2.3: Check on Identification Assumption
Balance in Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics
Coefficient of Log of Simulated IV
Dep. Var. Est. Std. Err. P-value Mean of Dep. Var.
Male -0.011 0.018 0.542 0.503
White 0.028 0.058 0.624 0.860
Median Age 2.004 3.855 0.605 40.719
High School Degree -0.044 0.098 0.653 0.333
Bachelor Degree 0.072 0.12 0.548 0.218
In Labor Force 0.050 0.074 0.506 0.626
LnMedian Income 0.190 0.207 0.361 10.132
Below Poverty Line -0.075 0.061 0.225 0.136
On Food Stamp -0.021 0.022 0.347 0.035
Occupied Housing 0.032 0.077 0.682 0.853
House Ownership 0.089 0.052 0.09 0.739
Moved Last Year 0.005 0.018 0.808 0.025
Note: This table shows the coefficients of the simulated instrument from equation 2.3
on characteristics of ZIP5 areas. Data on characteristics of ZIP5 level is from ACS
2008-2012 Summary Files. The sample includes only zipcode areas in commuting
zones that span state borders. Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting
zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimates
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications - OLS Estimates
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Average EITC 1.527* 3.872** 2.815* 0.027* 0.035** 0.034**
(0.835) (1.617) (1.587) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Mean of Dep. Var. 109.558 107.517 82.053 3.210 3.173 2.993
N 1820 3247 6772 1820 3247 6772
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distribution X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation
2.4, without instrumenting AvgEITCst using SimEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5
areas in the same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to
to ZIP5 areas within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas
within 20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that
allow payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME
and VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01
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Table 2.5: IV Estimates(Loan Applicatoins, Level-Level Specification)
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications - IV Estimates
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -8.272** -6.684*** -4.330*** -0.110*** -0.114*** -0.066***
(3.340) (2.256) (1.629) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016)
Mean of Dep. Var. 109.210 107.357 81.851 3.204 3.170 2.990
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -14.598** -11.379** -7.956** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.083***
(7.376) (5.301) (3.640) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022)
Mean of Dep. Var. 166.785 165.742 127.489 3.597 3.552 3.363
N 1825 3248 6769 1825 3248 6769
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distribution X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation 2.4,
using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas in the
same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within
10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state
borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans and
state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard
errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.6: IV Estimates (Loan Applicatoins, Log-Log Specification)
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications - IV Estimates
ln(#Borrower) ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
ln(Avg EITC) -2.507*** -2.535*** -1.584*** -2.812*** -2.928*** -1.942***
(0.505) (0.446) (0.399) (0.548) (0.485) (0.519)
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.204 3.170 2.990 3.597 3.552 3.363
N 1825 3248 6769 1825 3248 6769
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distribution X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation 2.4,
using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas in the
same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within
10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state
borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans and
state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard
errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.7: IV Estimates (Originated Loans, Level-Level Specification)
Effects of EITC on Originated Loans - IV Estimates
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -2.120*** -2.591*** -1.955*** -0.098*** -0.107*** -0.074***
(0.790) (0.835) (0.749) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.821 17.805 13.329 2.073 2.078 1.913
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -0.745 -2.132** -1.384* 0.016 -0.016 0.010
(0.973) (0.939) (0.816) (0.056) (0.060) (0.083)
Mean of Dep. Var. 43.104 41.899 30.146 2.623 2.621 2.414
N 1266 2256 4577 1266 2256 4577
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distributions X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation 2.4,
using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas in the
same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within
10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state
borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans and
state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard
errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.8: IV Estimates (Originated Loans, Level-Log/Log-Log Specification)
Effects of EITC on Originated Loans - IV Estimates
ln($Total Credit) ln($Average Credit)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -0.094 -0.102* -0.062* 0.022 0.023 0.024
(0.064) (0.053) (0.037) (0.050) (0.042) (0.040)
Mean of Dep. Var. 8.306 8.318 8.102 6.514 6.518 6.488
ln($Total Credit) ln($Average Credit)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
ln(Avg EITC) -2.057 -2.163* -1.368 0.452 0.489 0.540
(1.455) (1.174) (0.879) (1.159) (0.940) (0.933)
Mean of Dep. Var. 8.306 8.318 8.102 6.514 6.518 6.488
N 1266 2256 4577 1266 2256 4577
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distributions X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation
2.4, using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas
in the same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5
areas within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within
20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow
payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and
VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.9: IV Estimates (Default Rate of Orginated Loans)
Effects of EITC on Default Rate - IV Estimates
10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -0.012* -0.010* -0.015***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.270 0.271 0.263
N 1209 2157 4352
Total Population X X X
Income Distribution X X X
CZ FE X X X
Census Region FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100)
received using specification in equation 2.4, using SimEITCst as an
instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all
ZIP5 areas in the same commuting zones that span state borders. The
column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 10 km
of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to
ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level.
This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans
and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are
excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at
the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.10: IV Estimates with Additional Controls
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications with Additional Controls- IV Estimates
Adding State Level Controls
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -4.361 -3.372* -3.625** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.061***
(2.874) (2.021) (1.718) (0.022) (0.020) (0.014)
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -7.378 -5.949 -6.702** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.076***
(6.703) (4.553) (3.116) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016)
Adding Store Location Controls
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -6.650** -5.275** -3.885** -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.063***
(3.140) (2.181) (1.905) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -10.423 -8.699* -7.349* -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.080***
(7.580) (5.172) (3.870) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in
equation 2.4, using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes
all ZIP5 areas in the same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is
restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted
to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is
restricted to states that allow payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state
EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone
level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.11: IV Estiamtes with Varying Sample Restrictions
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications Varying Distance - IV Estimates
5 km 25 km 50 km 5 km 25 km 50 km
Loan Applications
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
Avg EITC -8.249*** -6.319*** -5.990*** -0.129*** -0.102*** -0.070***
(2.575) (2.036) (1.787) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
#Loans ln(#Loans)
Avg EITC -12.382** -10.928** -10.532*** -0.142*** -0.121*** -0.087***
(5.333) (4.830) (4.080) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027)
Originated Loans
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
Avg EITC -2.304*** -1.865*** -1.715*** -0.172*** -0.112*** -0.098***
(0.424) (0.356) (0.426) (0.050) (0.035) (0.033)
#Loans ln(#Loans)
Avg EITC -1.497 2.515 2.702 -0.100 -0.033 -0.009
(1.686) (2.675) (2.952) (0.076) (0.070) (0.071)
ln($Total Credit) ln($ Avg Credit)
Avg EITC -0.125 -0.048 -0.028 0.083** 0.086* 0.090
(0.101) (0.096) (0.098) (0.039) (0.051) (0.056)
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation
2.4, using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas
in the same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5
areas within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within
20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow
payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and
VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Chapter 3
Take-up of Workers’ Compensation Insurance in Texas
3.1 Introduction
Workers’ compensation is a large state-regulated insurance program that provides
covered employees with income and medical benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses.
Workers’ compensation has historically been an almost universal system, with nearly
all states mandating that employers provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage.
While states typically provide exemptions for very small employers or certain classes of
workers (e.g,. agricultural or domestic workers), approximately 90% of the US workforce
was covered by workers’ compensation insurance in 2012.1
Texas is unique among US states in having never enacted a coverage mandate for
workers’ compensation insurance, leaving employers in Texas free to choose whether or
not to participate in the state regulated workers compensation system. A worker who
suffers an on-the-job injury at a subscribing employer (i.e., an employer that participates
in the state workers’ compensation system by purchasing insurance coverage or through
self-insurance) receives workers’ compensation benefits as defined by statute. In contrast,
there are no statutorily defined benefits for a worker who suffers an on-the-job injury at a
1 Sengupta, I., Baldwin, M. L., & Reno, V. (2014). Workers Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and
Costs, 2012. Washington, DC.
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non-subscribing employer (i.e., an employer that has chosen not to participate in the state
workers’ compensation system), and such employers may be exposed to tort liability for
workplace injuries. In Texas, the total payroll covered by workers’ compensation insur-
ance policies was $266 billion in 2008, which represents roughly 70% of the total Texas
private industry payroll.2
Recently, lawmakers in several states have begun to re-evaluate their workers’
compensation coverage mandates and consider systems based on the Texas model. In
2013, Oklahoma enacted a law intended to allow employers to opt out of the state work-
ers’ compensation system,3 and a similar law was proposed during Tennessee’s most re-
cent legislative session.4 These recent legislative actions have revived the ongoing debate
about whether workers compensation insurance should be mandated. Proponents of work-
ers compensation mandates argue that workers compensation insurance benefits workers
through providing valuable recourse in the case of an on-the-job injury. Critics of work-
ers compensation mandates argue that alternative avenues for recourse are sufficient and
mandates raise firms operating costs such that workers are ultimately hurt through wage
and employment cuts.
The debate over coverage mandates in workers’ compensation raises several unan-
swered questions. Which employers are most likely to opt out of the workers’ compen-
2 Authors calculations based on the total covered payroll reported by the Texas Department of Insurance
and the total payroll in Texas as estimated from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3 Sengupta et al. (2014)
4 Fletcher, Holly. (2015). ”Bill Would Let Businesses Opt out of Workers’ Compensation,” The Ten-
nessean. February 22. Available at http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/22/bill-allow-
businesses-opt-workers-comp/23830533/. Accessed June 6, 2015
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sation system, and how responsive is take-up of workers’ compensation to the price of
coverage? How do the benefits of the workers’ compensation system compare to the costs
of the system, and what are the efficiency implications of workers’ compensation coverage
mandates? Despite the importance of these questions to the emerging debate over work-
ers’ compensation coverage mandates, evidence on the determinants of employer demand
for workers’ compensation coverage and the economic efficiency of coverage mandates is
extremely scarce. In this paper, we empirically examine employers’ decision to take up
workers’ compensation coverage within the context of the Texas Workers Compensation
system, with the aim of providing evidence on these questions.
Using unique administrative firm-level data on workers compensation coverage,
we exploit variation in insurance premiums resulting from regulatory updates to analyze
employer demand for workers compensation insurance. While the workers compensation
insurance system is optional in Texas, premiums for workers compensation insurance are
heavily regulated by the state. In particular, the government sets the relative premium
rates across industries. We leverage the differences-in-differences variation in premiums
induced by periodic regulatory updates of these across-industry relative rates. Our pre-
liminary estimates suggest that a 10% increase in premiums results in a 2.2% decline in
the number of firms providing workers compensation insurance and a 2% decline in the
payroll covered by workers compensation insurance. The demand estimates are precisely
estimated and are robust to different specifications.
Our research contributes to the broader literature on the demand for employer-
provided insurance. Much of the prior work on the demand for employer-provided insur-
ance focuses on contexts such as health insurance (e.g., Finkelstein (2002); Gruber and
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Lettau (2004); Kolstad and Kowalski (2016)) and long-term care insurance (e.g., Courte-
manche and He (2009)). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide
evidence on the demand for workers compensation insurance.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on workers compensation insurance.
Much of the prior literature on Workers Compensation insurance relates to either the in-
centive effects of program features (e.g., Krueger (1990a,b); Meyer et al. (1995)) or the in-
cidence of changes in the program (e.g., Fishback and Kantor (1995); Gruber and Krueger
(1991)). We contribute to this literature by analyzing the nature of employer demand for
workers compensation insurance and the potential efficiency implications of this coverage,
providing evidence pertinent to the ongoing policy debate surrounding workers compen-
sation mandates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides details on the institutional set-
ting. Section 3.3 and 3.4 introduces the data source, and discusses the empirical strategy.
Section 3.5 presents our results and discussion. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Workers’ Compensation in Texas
Workers’ compensation is a state-regulated insurance program that provides cov-
ered employees with income and medical benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses.
With workers’ compensation coverage, employers have protection from lawsuits result-
ing from employee job-related injuries and illnesses. Workers’ compensation insurance
could also encourage employers to implement additional cost-saving risk management for
workplace safety. Workers’ compensation is financed exclusively by employers in most
99
states. Employers could purchase workers’ compensation insurance from private insurers
or a state insurance fund. Some large employers might be eligible to self-insure.
Each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories has its own
workers compensation program.5 With the exception of Texas, workers’ compensation
insurance coverage is effectively mandatory for employers in all states.6 Texas private em-
ployers can choose whether or not to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage
for their employees.7
Workers’ compensation offers income benefits, medical benefits, burial benefits
and death benefits. Income benefits replace a portion of any wages one loses because of a
work-related injury or illness, and vary by the severity of injury and the duration of injury.
Medical benefits pay for all the necessary medical care to treat your work-related injury or
illness.
The cost of workers’ compensation varies mostly depending on the size of total
payroll, the risk of business, and history of injuries in the past. The basic premium de-
pends on the number of employees and cost of payroll. Each category of industry, defined
by the classification codes, is assigned a risk classification, which shows whether your
industry or company is a high- or low-risk employer and will determine how high the pre-
5 Separate U.S. government programs cover federal civilian employees and specific high-risk workers
(energy employees, workers’ exposed to radiation, veterans of military service etc.).
6 There are limited exceptions that typically exempt employers with a small number of employees or
workers in specific classifications, such as agricultural or domestic employees.
7However, government agencies and public institutions are required to provide workers’ compensation
insurance while also requiring such coverage from private employers who do business with them. Texas
employers who choose to opt out of the statutory system can create their own non-subscription work-injury
compensation program or offer no workers’ compensation benefits or protection at all and risk catastrophic
legal liability.
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mium is. The initial manual premium is further adjusted with premium credits and debits,
experience rating, large deductible credit, healthcare network credits, premium discount,
and other factors based on the characteristics of each employer. In 2008, the average
standard premium was $1.03 (per $100 payroll) for employers in Texas.
Employers who choose to have insurance may purchase workers’ compensation in-
surance policies from private insurance companies, or self-insure. The primary benefit for
employers with workers’ compensation coverage is protection from potential lawsuits by
employees on work related injuries. Employers without workers’ compensation coverage
(i.e. nonsubscribers) don’t have the same legal protections as employers that provide work-
ers’ compensation coverage. If an injured employee of a non-subscriber files lawsuit and
is able to prove that the injury was due to the employer’s negligence, the non-subscriber
could be subject to high damage awards. The non-subscriber might also be required to pay
defense-related legal expenses.
Employers choose to opt out of workers compensation insurance coverage for a
variety of reasons. Texas nonsubscribers can choose to provide additional benefits to their
workforce or work with health care professionals to develop programs to provide quality
care at a reasonable cost. Nonsubscribers can also customize their occupational injury
benefit plan to reduce the costs of work-related injuries.
In 2012, 67% of employers chose to purchase workers compensation insurance,
which covers 81% of workers in Texas. The cost of workers compensation could vary
substantially by industry and employer size. Large employers are more likely to take up
workers’ compensation insurance. The take-up rate is higher for industries with relatively
high risks, such as mining, utility construction and manufacturing.
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3.2.2 Insurance Market and Premium
Texas employers can obtain workers’ compensation coverage through self-insurance,
purchasing a workers’ compensation policy, or joining a workers’ compensation insurance
pool.
As of January 1, 1993, employers who meet certain safety and financial require-
ments may apply to be a certified self-insured employer in Texas. Self-insurance allows
an employer to assume the risk for the vast majority of its workers’ compensation liabil-
ity, and purchase some form of excess or stop-loss coverage to protect the employer from
catastrophic losses.8
In the standard insurance market, more than 270 insurance companies had positive
written premiums for workers’ compensation insurance in 2011. The total direct written
premiums for the workers’ compensation insurance market was about $2.16 billion in
Texas. The top 10 insurance company groups write 81.7% of the market and the top
writer, Texas Mutual Insurance Company, has 33.8% of the market based on the written
premium in 2011.9
All workers’ compensation insurance companies follow a very similar approach
8 Self-insurance provides employers with greater control over claims and disability management, and
also provides loss-control incentives for employers to promote workplace safety. To be eligible for the
certified self-insured program, private employers need to have an estimated unmodified manual insurance
premium of at least $500,000 in Texas , or at least $10,000,000 nationwide, and meet other qualifications.
As of January 1, 2016, there are about 130 employers who are self-insured. A detailed list of self-certified
employers could be found this link at the TDI
9 Texas Mutual, formerly the Texas Workers’ Compensation Fund, wrote nearly $730 million in direct
written premiums. The Legislature created Texas Mutual in 1991 to serve as a competitive force in the
marketplace, to guarantee the availability of workers’ compensation insurance in Texas, and to serve as an
insurance company of last resort. While Texas Mutual is the insurer of last resort, it predominately writes
voluntary business, competing with the rest of the workers’ compensation market.
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to calculating the premium for workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The cost of
workers’ compensation varies mostly depending on the number of employees, risk of the
business, and history of injuries in the past.
The basic premium depends on the classification of employees and the size of
payroll. Each industry is assigned a risk classification. The classification code shows
whether your industry or company is a high- or low-risk employer and will determine how
high the premium is.10
Some kinds of work naturally have a higher exposure to risk for workplace injuries.
Each classification code has a corresponding premium rate (i.e. manual rates) based on
each $100 of payroll. For example, clerical workers (classification code 8810) have lower
risks of injury and benefit payments and thus a lower manual rate is applied compared
to a higher risk group such as construction workers (classification code 7538). Using the
rates published by the Texas Department of Insurance in 2006, the manual rate for clerical
workers was 0.46 (46 cents per $100 payroll), while that for construction workers was
22.66.11
Insurers can calculate the manual premium by multiplying the rate for a classi-
fication by payroll (per $100 dollars). If the liability limit is increased, expected future
benefits will also proportionally increase.12 Therefore, costs associated with an increased
10 The code for each company is based on statistics compiled by the National Council on Compensation
Insurance (NCCI), which tracks statistics gathered by hundreds of insurance carriers in several states.
11 Some occupations are common to so many businesses that special classifications have been established
for them. These special classifications are called standard exception classifications. Employees within the
definition of a standard exception classification are not included in a basic classification unless the basic
classification specifically includes those employees.
12 The most common liability limit chosen by Texas employers is $1 million.
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liability limit are applied to the manual premium.
The initial manual premium is further adjusted with experience rating using expe-
rience modification factors (or experience modifier), which are designed to give businesses
a financial incentive for maintaining safer workplaces. The experience modification factor
predicts an employer’s future losses by looking at their past loss experience. This experi-
ence modifier shows whether one company’s losses from employee compensation benefits
are at, above or below average and is multiplied by the company’s manual premium to
determine the employee compensation rate. The experience modifier is re-calculated each
year using the combined claims from a three-year rolling period.13
Employers could reduce the premium by choosing large deductible plans. De-
ductible plan credits amounted to almost $1.5 billion in 2008, representing about a 30%
discount of the modified premium.14
Insurers have the option to adjust rates further using the schedule rating or modeled
rating factors. Schedule rating is an optional rating plan that carriers may file which allows
the carrier to deviate from their filed rates based on the individual characteristics of a
risk. For example, insurers can assign credits for an automated work environment or
13 Some employers with higher than average injury experience may see their manual premium increase
via an experience rating modifier that is greater than 1. Small employers can also benefit from the Premium
Incentive for Small Employers program that requires credits, discounts and surcharges for small employers
based on their most recent one to two years of experience. For example, an employer who falls within the
average range would typically get an experience modification factor of 100 and would be charged the full
base rate. On the other hand, an employer with an experience modification factor of 90 might see a 10%
savings, while an employer with a factor of 110 would pay 10% more. Experience modification factors
have a direct impact on premium rates and create incentives for each company to work to reduce workplace
accidents.
14 Large deductible plans are those policies with a deductible amount of $100,000 or more. As a result,
large deductible plan discounts are mostly for medium to large employers who are willing to pay out-of-
pocket expenses up to the deductible amount.
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safety officers on staff, and assign debits for hazardous machinery. The modeled rating
factor is an optional multiplicative factor, which takes into consideration individual risk
characteristics and the loss experience of the insured employer.
To offer incentives for containing medical costs of injured works, a healthcare
network credit could be applied to the policies. An insurance carrier can either establish
its own network for certification or can contract with a network that has been certified.15
In addition, there will be a premium discount, based on the size of the premium.
The premium discount recognizes that the relative expense of issuing and servicing larger
premium policies is less than for smaller premium policies.
Finally, each policy is subject to an expense constant and terrorism premium debit,
which is a premium charge which applies to every policy in addition to the premium. It
covers expenses such as those for issuing, recording and auditing, which are common to
all workers’ compensation policies regardless of premium size.
To summarize, insurers start with the risk classification of employees and the size
of total payroll to calculate the manual rates, and further adjust the initial premium based
on the past claims of the employer, features of the insurance policy, individual character-
istics of the employer, and other surcharges. In 2008, the average standard premium was
$1.03 (per $100 payroll) for employers in Texas. Theoretically, a 1% change in the manual
rates (or relativity) would lead to a 1% increase in premium for employers, holding other
factors constant.
15 The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) anticipates that certified workers’ compensation health care
networks will help reduce the cost of workers’ compensation claims in Texas and that the cost savings should




To identify the causal effect of price on the take-up of workers’ compensation
coverage, we need to isolate exogenous variation in premium. Given the differences across
industry and business cycles in the insurance market, analysis using cross-sectional or
time-series data alone could be problematic and suffer from endogeneity problem.
As described in section 2.3, insurers take into account both industry specific and
firm specific risks when calculating the premium for each policy. To overcome the en-
dogeneity issue, this paper takes advantages of cross-industry and cross-year variation in
the manual rates that are used as the initial input of premium calculations. Based on the
formulas for pricing insurance policies, 1% increase in manual dates should translate to
1% increase in premium.
The manual rates are frequently updated by the Texas Department of Insurance
and vary substantially across industry and over time. The variation in manual rates are
mostly driven by industry-level claim history from the past five years with a three-year
lag, and adjustments due to budget concerns. More importantly, the manual rates are not
correlated with individual firm’s own specific risk. In addition, using manual rates allow
us to overcome the issue the actual premium is not observed for firms that choose to opt
out of workers’ compensation coverage.
3.3.2 Estimating Equations
Let i represent industry and t represents time period. The main regression is spec-
ified as follows:
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yit = α + βrit + δi + θt + λit+ εzt (3.1)
where yit is the dependent variable and rit is the relativity. The specification in-
cludes time period fixed effects (θt), industry (measured by classification, NAICS or SIC
codes) fixed effects (δi), and industry-specific time trends (λit).16
To measure the coverage of workers’ compensation insurance, we use the number
of covered firms in industry i and time t, and the number of newly covered firms in industry
i and time t as the outcomes of interest.17 We also look at outcomes such as the total
covered payroll in industry i and time t to measure coverage in terms of dollars.
3.4 Data
The data for this project come from difference sources. The manual rates of work-
ers’ compensation and subscriber data are from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI).
TDI published relativities (or manual rates), covered payroll and total costs for each clas-
sification for each policy year (PY).18 Data on covered payroll and costs are available
from 1993 to 2011, and relativities are available from 1999 to 2015. Subscriber data is
at policy level from 2005 to 2013, with information on employers, including the Federal
16 For some of the results reported, we include industry specific trend at 3-digit classification level. In our
sample, there are about 360 distinct 4-digit classification codes, and about 240 distinct 3-digit classification
codes.
17 Workers’ compensation insurance policies are originated throughout the year. From our analysis of
subscriber data, the timing of policy origination and renewal doesn’t seem to be correlated with changes in
the relativities.
18 Policy year differs from calendar year because firms don’t necessarily have to start insurances coverage
in the beginning of each calendar year. From the subscriber data, about 13% of firms have policy effective
dates in January, and the rest of the firms have policies originated throughout the year.
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Employer Identification Number (FEIN), name, and address, classification code, policy
effective date, and policy expiration date.
For our analysis, we aggregate the policies to quarterly-classification or yearly-
classification level and match with the relativities for each classification in the policy year
to examine the effect on the number of subscribers. We also look at the covered payroll
and costs at policy-year and classification level.
Table 3.6 shows examples of relativities for several classifications with large pay-
roll size. Relativities vary substantially across industries. For high-risk classification, such
as roofing and construction, manual rates are above 20, which means the costs of injuries
on the job is more than $20 for each $100 payroll. On the other hand, for low-risk classifi-
cations, such as clerical office employees, the costs of injuries for each $100 payroll is as
low as $0.46.
A full list of relativities by the date of update is shown in table 3.5. Panel A
shows the mean and percentiles of relativities. Panel B shows the mean and percentiles
of relativities normalized by the average relativities each year. The level of relativities are
adjusted down across-the-board by 7% in 2005, 2008, and 2011, and by 10% in 2009.
The relativities vary over time as well. Figure 3.1 shows the histogram of year-
to-year changes in relativities separately for years without re-basing and with re-basing.
The changes are capped at 25% for all years. For years with across-the-board reductions,
relativities for all industries are shifted down by 7% or 10%.
Table 3.4 shows the covered payroll, average manual rates and average premium
by year. Average manual rates and average premium are measured in terms of $100 pay-
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roll. The size of covered payroll increased over time. Average manual rates and average
premium were highest in the early 2000s and have decreased slightly in recent years.
Table 3.1 presents the take-up rate over time in Texas from 2001 to 2012. Around
65% of employers chose to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, which covers
about 80% of workers in Texas. Take-up rates vary by the size of employers and the
industry. As shown in table 3.2, large firms are more likely to purchase insurance with
take-up rates above 80%. Firms in industries with higher risk of work-related injuries are
more likely to have coverage, such as mining, utilities construction and manufacturing, as
shown in table 3.3.
3.5 Estimation Results
To examine the effect of premium on the take-up decision, table 3.7 shows the
estimates on the number of covered firms and the number of newly enrolled firms, using
the specification in equation 3.1. We consider two separate time periods, from 2005 to
2011 and from 2005 to 2013.19 The first and third column include classification fixed
effects and time (in quarters) fixed effects, and the second and fourth column include
also classification specific time trends. We find that a 10% increase in relativities reduces
the number of newly enrolled firms by 2%. The effect on the number of covered firms are
similar. The estimates imply that the price elasticity of demand for workers’ compensation
insurance is modest, with magnitude around -0.2.
Table 3.8 reports the results from similar regressions using annual level data. The
19 The time period from 2005 to 2011 matches with the availability of data on covered payroll and costs.
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magnitude of the estimates are slightly larger. We find that 10% increase in relativities
reduces the number of newly enrolled firms by 2.9%, and the number of covered firms by
2.6%.
To also account for the differences in firm size, table 3.9 examines the effect on
the covered payroll. We find that a 10% increase in relativities reduces the total covered
payroll by 2%.
3.5.1 Robustness Check
One robustness check takes advantage of the fact that relativities are not changed
by more than 25% in either direction (see figure 3.2). If the changes in outcome variables
are driven by other changes in the industry correlated with the update but not related to
premium, then we would expect to see changes in the outcome variables associated with
the hypothetical unconstrained relativities above and beyond correlation with the actual








1(r̃it > 1.25ri,t−1|r̃it < 0.75ri,t−1)
}
+ δi + θt + λit+ εit.
(3.2)
where r̃it is the counterfactual relativity assuming there were no bound on the
possible update (uncapped or raw relativity), and p is the degree of the polynomial. If the
identification assumption for the baseline difference-in-differences holds, then we should
expect the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms (γ) to be insignificant and close
to zero.
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Table 3.10 shows the results on the number of covered firms using levels of relativ-
ity and cubic polynomial terms. As expected, the estimated coefficients of the interaction
terms are not significant. We have also looked at covered payroll and estimated similar
specifications using log of relativity, and have the insignificant interaction terms. This set
of robustness check suggest that the change in coverage are from the actual relativities
that are regulated by TDI, rather than the changes in costs or in the industry that are not
correlated with premium.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the take-up of workers’ compensation insurance
coverage by employers in Texas, using variation in premium from regulatory updates. We
find that a 10% increase in regulated premium reduces the number of covered firms by
2%. The effect on covered payroll is similar. These estimates suggest a modest price
elasticity of demand for workers’ compensation insurance coverage of -0.2, comparable
to the estimates of price elasticity of demand for health insurance by employers in the
literature.
Although the firm-level data do not allow us to disentangle the effects of the num-
ber of covered workers and implement full welfare analysis, we rely on the size of covered
payroll to account for differences in firm size. Going forward, with more detailed firm-
level data on wages and employment, we could get a better understanding of the welfare
implications of mandates for workers’ compensation insurance coverage. We also plan to
further examine the selection in the insurance market by looking at different risk groups
and heterogeneity by firms’ characteristics.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
3.7.1 Figures
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Percentage changes in relativity from previous year, for re-basing years
(b)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in relativity relative to the previous year. Changes in
relativities are capped at 25%, before any across-the-board adjustment. The top panel shows the changes for
non-rebasing years. In the bottom panel, relativities for all classifications are reduced by 7% in 2005, 2008
and 2011, and by 10% in 2009.
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Plot of Raw Relativity and Capped Relativity, 1999 to 2013
Notes: This figure shows the scatter plot of raw relativity and the capped relativity from 1999 and 2013. The
horizontal axis represents the ratio of raw relativity to current relativity. Current relativity is the regulated
relativity in effect from last update (typically last year). The vertical axis represents the ratio of capped
relativity to current relativity, where the ratio is capped at .75 and 1.25.
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3.7.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Take-up Rates of Workers’ Compensation in Texas







Source: The take-up rate estimates in 2001 are from
the Research and Oversight Council on Workers’
Compensation and Public Policy Research Institute;
and estimates from 2004 to 2014 are from the Texas
Department of Insurance Workers’ Compensation Re-
search and Evaluation Group and Public Policy Re-
search Institute.
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Table 3.2: Take-up Rates of Workers’ Compensation by Employer Size
# of Employees 2001 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
1-4 53% 54% 57% 60% 59% 59% 57%
5-9 71% 63% 64% 69% 70% 71% 73%
10-49 81% 75% 74% 77% 80% 81% 79%
50-99 84% 80% 81% 82% 84% 81% 82%
100-499 87% 84% 83% 84% 87% 88% 86%
500+ 86% 80% 79% 74% 85% 83% 81%
Source: The take-up rate estimates in 2001 are from the Research and Oversight
Council on Workers’ Compensation and Public Policy Research Institute; and
estimates from 2004 to 2014 are from the Texas Department of Insurance Work-
ers’ Compensation Research and Evaluation Group and Public Policy Research
Institute.
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Table 3.3: Take-up Rates of Workers’ Compensation by Industry
Industry Type 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting 61% 75% 73% 75% 71% 74%
Mining, Utilities Construction 68% 79% 72% 81% 78% 80%
Manufacturing 58% 63% 69% 69% 71% 75%
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Transportation 60% 63% 71% 68% 74% 66%
Finance, Real Estate, Professional Services 68% 67% 67% 67% 68% 71%
Health Care, Educational Services 59% 56% 61% 68% 65% 59%
Arts, Entertainment, Accommodation, Food Services 46% 48% 54% 60% 60% 61%
Other Services Except Public Administration 61% 58% 64% 58% 51% 53%
Source: The take-up rate estimates in 2001 are from the Research and Oversight Council on Workers’ Compensation
and Public Policy Research Institute; and estimates from 2004 to 2014 are from the Texas Department of Insurance
Workers’ Compensation Research and Evaluation Group and Public Policy Research Institute.
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Table 3.4: Covered Payroll, Manual Rates and Average Premium by Year
Policy Year Covered Payroll Manual Rates Average Premium
2000 194,641,734,299 2.77 1.27
2001 199,930,429,576 2.93 1.32
2002 194,358,418,377 3.30 1.52
2003 198,085,623,131 3.20 1.66
2004 204,233,950,515 3.17 1.60
2005 222,110,691,113 2.92 1.43
2006 241,285,770,452 2.80 1.36
2007 265,757,149,487 2.58 1.18
2008 265,918,225,355 2.23 1.03
Note: Manual rates and average premium are measured for each $100 payroll.
Source: Costs to Employers and Efficiencies In the Texas Workers Compensation
System, Texas Department of Insurance, Workers Compensation Research and
Evaluation Group, 9/1/2011.
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Table 3.5: Relativities by Date of Update
Panel A: relativities
Date Mean 10th PCTL 25th PCTL 50th PCTL 75th PCTL 90th PCTL
1/1/1999 8.78 2.32 4.25 7.23 10.84 17.46
1/1/2000 8.69 2.42 4.47 7.31 10.64 16.51
1/1/2001 8.63 2.44 4.54 7.37 10.51 15.90
1/1/2002 8.69 2.36 4.48 7.56 10.69 15.69
1/1/2003 8.63 2.39 4.66 7.43 10.57 15.21
1/1/2005 7.94 2.29 4.32 6.96 9.60 14.95
1/1/2006 7.91 2.31 4.36 6.82 9.58 15.34
3/1/2007 7.87 2.21 4.40 6.87 9.73 14.38
1/1/2008 7.42 2.07 4.11 6.48 9.27 12.87
5/1/2009 6.74 1.74 3.63 5.84 8.39 11.94
6/1/2011 6.28 1.68 3.33 5.47 7.82 11.42
6/1/2013 6.07 1.63 3.33 5.37 7.52 10.75
Panel B: relativities (normalized)
Date Mean 10th PCTL 25th PCTL 50th PCTL 75th PCTL 90th PCTL
1/1/1999 1 0.26 0.48 0.82 1.23 1.99
1/1/2000 1 0.28 0.51 0.84 1.22 1.90
1/1/2001 1 0.28 0.53 0.85 1.22 1.84
1/1/2002 1 0.27 0.52 0.87 1.23 1.80
1/1/2003 1 0.28 0.54 0.86 1.22 1.76
1/1/2005 1 0.29 0.54 0.88 1.21 1.88
1/1/2006 1 0.29 0.55 0.86 1.21 1.94
3/1/2007 1 0.28 0.56 0.87 1.24 1.83
1/1/2008 1 0.28 0.55 0.87 1.25 1.73
5/1/2009 1 0.26 0.54 0.87 1.24 1.77
6/1/2011 1 0.27 0.53 0.87 1.25 1.82
6/1/2013 1 0.27 0.55 0.88 1.24 1.77
Note: The above table lists the mean and percentiles of the percentage updates to relativities, across clas-
sification level observations. Panel A displays summary statistics for the actual relativity updates. Panel B
displays summary statistics for the relativity updates, normalized to the annual average of each year.
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Table 3.6: Selected Examples of Relativities in 2006
Classification Description 2003 Payroll Relativity
7538 electric light or power line construction & drivers $ 94,342,002 22.66
5551 roofing - all kinds - & yard employees, drivers $ 79,394,461 21.07
6202 oil or gas well & drivers $ 634,795,692 16.60
7219 trucking: noc - all employees & drivers $ 1,890,757,258 14.43
3724 machinery or equipment erection or repair & drivers $ 1,121,976,247 7.09
8748 automobile salespersons $ 1,411,568,846 0.85
8832 physician & clerical $ 4,923,987,040 0.75
8742 salespersons, collectors or messengers - outside $ 15,661,961,713 0.74
8809 executive officers noc - outside duties $ 4,990,449,649 0.62
8810 clerical office employees noc $ 76,587,441,705 0.46
Source: Relativites and covered payroll are published by the Texas Department of Insurance.
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Table 3.7: The Effects of Relativities on Covered Firms
Dependent Var.: ln(# firms newly enrolledit)
ln(relativityit) -0.168** -0.208*** -0.158** -0.175***
(0.075) (0.065) (0.064) (0.059)
N 9205 9205 11841 11841
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.243 4.243 4.247 4.247
Dependent Var.: ln(# firms enrolledit)
ln(relativityit) -0.227*** -0.215*** -0.222*** -0.202***
(0.062) (0.056) (0.052) (0.054)
N 9205 9205 11841 11841
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.481 4.481 4.524 4.524
Classification FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Classification specific trend X X
Level of Aggregation
i represents classification classification classification classification
t represents quarter quarter quarter quarter
Included Time Span PY 2005-2011 PY 2005-2011 PY 2005-2013 PY 2005-2013
Note: This table shows estimates on the number of firms enrolled and the number of firms newly enrolled using
specifications from equation 3.1. Data is at the classification-year level from 2005 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered
at the classification level.
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Table 3.8: The Effects of Relativities on Covered Firms (Annual)
Dependent Var.: ln(# firms newly enrolledit)
ln(relativityit) -0.259* -0.285** -0.285** -0.235**
(0.139) (0.116) (0.111) (0.104)
N 2497 2497 3211 3211
Mean of Dep. Var. 5.362 5.362 5.362 5.362
Dependent Var.: ln(# firms enrolledit)
ln(relativityit) -0.320*** -0.261*** -0.322*** -0.238***
(0.082) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076)
N 2498 2498 3212 3212
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.772 4.772 4.815 4.815
Classification FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Classification specific trend X X
X X
Level of Aggregation
i represents classification classification classification classification
t represents year year year year
Included Time Span PY 2005-2011 PY 2005-2011 PY 2005-2013 PY 2005-2013
Note: This table shows estimates on the number of firms enrolled and the number of firms newly enrolled using
specifications from equation 3.1. Data is at the classification-year level from 2005 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered
at the classification level.
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Table 3.9: The Effects of Relativities on Covered Payroll
Dependent Var.: ln(total covered payrollit)
ln(relativityit) -0.237*** -0.199* -0.281*** -0.069
(0.087) (0.105) (0.075) (0.078)
N 2394 2394 4519 4519
Mean of Dep. Var. 18.122 18.122 17.976 17.976
Classification FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Classification specific trend X X
Level of Aggregation
i represents classification classification classification classification
t represents year year year year
Included Time Span PY 2005-2011 PY 2005-2011 PY 1999-2011 PY 1999-2011
Note: This table shows estimates on total covered payroll using specifications from equation 3.1. Data is at the
classification-year level from 1999 to 2011. Standard errors are clustered at the classification level.
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Table 3.10: Robustness Analyses: Workers’ Compensation Demand
ln(#firms enrolledit) ln(#firms newly enrolledit)
RawRelativity -0.047** -0.053** -0.045* -0.061***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
RawRelativity2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RawRelativity3 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capped*RawRelativity -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.016
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Capped*RawRelativity2 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Capped*RawRelativity3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Classification FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Class-specific trend X X
F-test of interaction terms
P-value 0.551 0.484 0.458 0.136
Level of Aggregation
i represents classification classification classification classification
t represents quarter quarter quarter quarter
Included Time Span PY 2005-2013 PY 2005-2013 PY 2005-2013 PY 2005-2013
Note: This table shows estimates on number of firms enrolled or newly enrolled using specification in equation 3.2.
Raw relativity is the relativity without the 25% cap on changes in relavitiy update. Capped is an indicator for the
classification-quarter observations where the relavitiy updates are higher than 25% in either direction. Data is at the





Appendix: Financial Incentives and Physicians’ Behavior
A.1 Data Construction
Texas Workers’ Compensation Medical Claims Data
Texas Workers’ Compensation Medical Claims Data is obtained from the Texas
Department of Insurance.1 The data file for professional services contains billing informa-
tion for doctors and other healthcare professionals, including ambulatory surgical centers
(ASC). For each quarter, it includes a header and detail file. The header file contains
billing level information, including provider information and diagnosis, and the detail file
contains itemized service level information, such as HCPCS codes and place of services.
Texas Physicians Registry Data
Texas Physicians Registry Data is available from Texas Medical Board, and in-
cludes all Texas-licensed physicians, current and non-current (deceased, retired, etc.). In-
formation includes unique ID, license number, name, mailing address, practice address,
birth year, birthplace, medical school, graduation year, license issuance date, license ex-
piration date, registration status code and date, county name, gender code, and ethnic-
ity code. Also includes degree, primary and secondary specialty, method of licensure,
1 Details on professional services public use data can be found at this link.
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state/country of reciprocity, practice type code, practice setting code, and practice time
code fields.
For each medical bill, there is a billing provider or (and) rendering bill provider
reported. In the case where rendering bill provider is not present, the billing provider is
assumed to be the rendering provider for all services on this bill. If the billing provider was
not an individual, a jurisdiction may require a rendering bill provider to be specified. I use
the state license number from Texas Physicians Registry Data and license number reported
for billing provider or rendering bill provider from Texas Workers’ Compensation Medical
Claims Data to match physicians. Among claims with physicians who are licensed in
Texas and have Doctor of Medicine (MD) degrees, 85% of claims are successfully matched
to the Texas Physicians Registry Data.
Official Disability Guidelines (ODG) Data
Official Disability Guidelines (ODG) provides medical treatment guidelines and
return-to-work guidelines for conditions commonly associated with the workplace illness
or injuries. ODG is designed for clinical practice as well as utilization review/management.
To facilitate our understanding of medical coding and treatment for various injuries, I use
the treatment guidelines and Crosswalk UR Advisor from ODG to obtain information on
recommended medical treatment, auto-approved medical services and statistics on costs,
duration of treatment, and day away from work.
A.2 Medical Procedure Codes
Definition of types of procedures
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I follow the CPT Standard codebook to classify CPT (HCPCS level I) codes. Surgi-
cal medical services are defined as CPT codes from 10021 to 69990. The types of medical
services in section 1.5.3 is defined as follows:
• Integumentary System: 10040 - 19499
• Musculoskeletal System: 20000 - 29999
• Cardiovascular System: 33010 - 39599
• Digestive System: 40490 - 49999
• Nervous System: 61000 - 64999
• Evaluation and Management: 99201 - 99499
• Anesthesia: 00100 - 01999 99100 - 99150
• Radiology: 70000 - 79999
• Pathology and Laboratory: 80000 - 89398
• Medicine: 90281 - 99099 99151 - 99199 99500 - 99607
• Device and Equipment: HCPCS Level II
Definition of discretionary procedures
Following Card et al. (2009), I performed a t-test of equality of likelihood of week-
end and weekday visits for different medical procedures. If medical procedures are not de-
ferrable, it is more likely that the t-statistics would be insignificant. On the other hand, for
discretionary medical procedures, it is less likely to be done during weekdays. I classify
the medical procedures with t-statistics above the median in the distribution as elective
medical procedures, which are grouped by BETOS codes and listed below.
• P1F: Major Procedure - Explor/Decompr/Excisdisc
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• P1G: Major Procedure - Other
• P2F: Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Other
• P3D: Major Procedure, Orthopedic - Other
• P5A: Ambulatory Procedures - Skin
• P5B: Ambulatory Procedures - Musculoskeletal
• P5E: Ambulatory Procedures - Other
• P6A: Minor Procedures - Skin
• P6B: Minor Procedures - Musculoskeletal
• P6C: Minor Procedures - Other
• P8A: Endoscopy - Arthroscopy
• I1F: Standard Imaging - Other
• I4B: Imaging/Procedure - Other
• T1A: Lab Tests - Routine Venipuncture
An alternative definition of discretionary procedures is using the classification from
Medicare Part B data. I convert HCPCS codes to BETOS codes using a crosswalk avail-
able from CMS, and follow the categorization used by Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) to
determine which procedures are for less discretionary care. Specifically, I define elective
procedures as claims associated with the following BETOS codes:
• P2A: Major procedure, cardiovascular - CABG
• P2C: Major Procedure, cardiovascular - Thromboendarterectomy
• P2D: Major procedure, cardiovascular - Coronary angioplasty (PTCA)
• P3B: Major procedure, orthopedic - Hip replacement
• P3C: Major procedure, orthopedic - Knee replacement
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• P4B: Eye procedure - cataract removal/lens insertion
• P5A: Ambulatory procedures - skin
• P5B: Ambulatory procedures - musculoskeletal
• P6A: Minor procedures - skin
• P6B: Minor procedures - musculoskeletal
• P8A: Endoscopy - arthroscopy
• P8B: Endoscopy - upper gastrointestinal
• P8C: Endoscopy - sigmoidoscopy
• P8D: Endoscopy - colonoscopy
• P8E: Endoscopy - cystoscopy
• P8F: Endoscopy - bronchoscopy
• P8G: Endoscopy - laparoscopic cholecystectomy
• P8H: Endoscopy - laryngoscopy
• I4A: Imaging/procedure - heart including cardiac catheter
When exploring whether the response in quantity is more pronounced for elec-
tive surgical services, using definition of elective procedures from Clemens and Gottlieb
(2014), figure A.4 shows the effect on quantity for elective surgical services. The estimates
are close to the baseline results with slightly larger magnitude from 2010 to 2012, though
not significantly different from the baseline estimates.
A.3 Details on Workers’ Compensation in Texas
According to the Survey of Employer Participation in the Texas Workers’ Com-
pensation System conducted by the Workers’ Compensation Research Center and the
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Public Policy Research Institute (PPRI) at Texas A&M University, 67% of Texas em-
ployers participated in the Texas Workers’ Compensation program in 2012, covering 83%
of Texas workers. Large employers are more likely to be “subscribers”, with a partic-
ipation rate around 83% in 2012. It is estimated that 75% of employees employed by
non-subscribers are covered by non-subscriber alternative occupational benefit plans that
pay medical and/or wage benefits to injured employees.
According to the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Premium Rate Ranking reports,
premium rates in Texas has a similar trend as the national average premium rates, and are
about 15% higher than the national average from 2004 to 2010. There has been across-the-
board reductions in reluctivities regulated by TDI during the time period studied. However,
these changes in premiums applies to all employers in all industries and locations and
should be independent of the medical care received by injured workers.
According to the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) conducted
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the incidence of nonfatal injuries in Texas has a
similar trend as the national statistics, as shown in figure A.3, with declining incidence of
injuries over time.
Similarity between Worker’s Compensation patients and patients covered by health
insurance
One might be worried that the medical conditions and treatment Worker’s Com-
pensation patients are different from those covered by health insurance, such as employer-
sponsored health insurance, Medicaid or Medicare. If so, the generalizability of empirical
results in this paper would be limited. To address this concern, using the top 30 medical
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conditions for patients from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I listed the
medical conditions that are also popular for Worker’s Compensation patients below.
• Mental disorders
• Osteoarthritis and other non-traumatic joint disorders
• Back problems
• Trauma-related disorders





• Other care and screening
• Acute bronchitis and upper respiratory infection




A.4.1 Additional Robustness Checks
Following Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) and Card and McCall (1996), I group pa-
tients’ main diagnosis into three categories using ICD-9 diagnosis codes: (1) Strains or
Sprains, (2) Non-Sprains, and (3) Occupational Diseases, and estimate the same specifica-
tion separately for the three categories. Results are shown in table A.2. The estimates are
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roughly the same across these three types of diagnosis.
In addition to the analysis complementariness between surgical and nonsurgical
services, table A.1 shows the estimated effects for those are less likely to be complemen-
tary to surgical services. Column (1) uses a subsample of nonsurgical services with certain
surgical services during course of treatment for the same patients, same as figure 1.10 (a).
In comparison, column (2) uses a subsample of nonsurgical services without any surgical
services during course of treatment for the same patients. Column (3) uses nonsurgical
services that are performed within 20 days of certain surgical services, same as figure 1.10
(b). Column (4) uses nonsurgical services that are performed more than 20 days of certain
surgical services. See text in section 1.5.2 for more details.
A.4.2 Analysis on Referrals
Referrals are an important part of healthcare, while little is know about whether
payments impact referrals. Taking advantage of the policy change in reimbursement rate
for WC claims, I examine the change in referrals in different types of healthcare manage-
ment systems.
TDI encourages participation in healthcare networks to increase access for work-
ers and lower costs. Healthcare networks started in 2006, and has been steadily expanding
over time. For Workers’ Compensation claims, the primary care physician who first initi-
ates the treatment for covered workers would serve as the gate-keeper doctor and monitor
the course of treatment to contain cost. All referrals to specialists have to be made by
the gate-keeper doctor. The increase in reimbursement rate for surgical services impact
mostly people with surgical specialties, who would have the possibility to perform some
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kind of surgical services. It is possible that physicians in the same network could share any
additional payment together. As a result, a primary care physician in healthcare networks
could be incentivized to give out more referrals to specialists within the same network.
Here I analyze whether primary care physicians in the healthcare networks are
more likely to give referrals to specialities after the increase in reimbursement, compared
to primary care physicians not in network.
To answer this question, I estimate the following specification in equation A.1
following a difference-in-difference framework, using interaction terms between network




βt1tNeworki + αt1t + θNetworki + αXit + θInterimt + εit (A.1)
where t is the index of time (measured by year), i is an index for individual worker,
Neworki is an indicator for workers whose primary care physicians are in healthcare
networks, αt is the year fixed effects, and βt is the set coefficients for interaction terms
between network status and year dummies. Year 2007 is omitted.2
Figure A.5 plots the estimates for βt, coefficients of the interaction terms. Av-
eraging the estimated effects from 2010 to 2012, after policy change, the probability of
visiting a specialist is 5.5 percentage points higher for providers in network than those
2 Texas House Bill 7, which was passed in 2005, allowed the formation of workers’ compensation
healthcare networks. An healthcare network is an organization formed to provide healthcare services to
injured employees. Year 2005 is excluded from this analysis, because TDI started to certify the healthcare
networks from early 2006. As of February 1, 2012, there were 30 TDI-certified networks.
133
not in network (mean of dependent variable is 0.44), and share of visits to specialists is
4.2 percentage points higher for providers in network than those not in network (mean
of dependent variable is 0.62). These estimates suggest that physicians in healthcare net-
works are more likely to refer patients to specialists after the increase in reimbursement
for surgical services in a facility.
A.4.3 Analysis on Physicians Treating WC Patients
Increase in reimbursement rates could potentially attract more physicians to treat
injured workers in Texas, thus improving access to care for workers. Recall that the in-
crease in reimbursement rates only applies to surgical services performed in facility set-
tings. The increase in reimbursement mostly benefits physicians with a surgical speciality,
who are able to perform surgical services. As confirmed by medical claims data, the
majority of surgical services are performed by physicians with surgical specialities.3 In
this section, I examine whether the increase in reimbursement rates for surgical services
induce more participation from providers with surgical specialities in Workers’ Compen-
sation system.4
First, I aggregate physicians who have treated patients in the Texas Workers’ Com-
pensation system to the specialty and year level. For each specialty, I assign an indicator,
3 Examples of surgical specialities includes general surgery, orthopedic surgery, neurological surgery,
cardiovascular surgery, and thoracic surgery. Surgical services account for about on average 23.31% of total
services provided by physicians with surgical specialties, while only 5% for physicians with other specialties.
4 In an ideal case, one would measure participation as physicians’ intention to treat patients on worker
compensation benefits. However, due to data limitation, here participation is measured as the actual treat-
ment of injured workers, as observed in claims data. As patients from Workers’ Compensation is a small
fraction of the overall pool of potential patients for physicians, this measure is limited. The results presented
here for provider level analysis should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
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which equals to one if the specialty is related to performing surgeries.5 Then I estimate a
specification in equation A.2 with interactions terms between year indicators and surgical
speciality indicators using the aggregated data at speciality and year level. I look at out-
comes such as the total number of physicians, the total number of claims and the total or




βt1tSurgicalSpecialitys + αt1t + θs1s + εst (A.2)
where t is the index of time (measured by year), s represents physicians’ specialty,
SurgicalSpecialitys is an indicator for surgical specialty, θs are specialty fixed effects, αt
is the year fixed effects, and βt is the set coefficients for interaction terms between surgical
specialty dummy and year dummies. Year 2007 is the omitted category.
Results from this set of analysis is in table A.3. After the policy change in early
2008, we observe an increase of 17% to 32% in total number of physicians in surgical spe-
cialty, compared with total number of physicians in other specialties (in table A.3 column
1). The supply of physicians is unlikely to be affected by the change in reimbursement
rates. The estimates indicate that more physicians with surgical specialty treated injured
workers, due to the increase in reimbursement rates for surgical services. In addition, the
total number of claims, the total amount paid and the average amount paid also increased
after 2008 for physicians with surgical specialties.
5 In the physician registry data from Texas Medical Board, physicians could report a secondary specialty
in addition to their primary specialty. If either the primary specialty or the secondary specialty involves
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Notes: Figure (a) shows the distribution of place of service for injured workers’ first claim. Figure (b) shows
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of duration of treatment for injured workers. To minimize the
possibility of truncation, employees with first claims in 2005 and 2012 are excluded, and employees with
last claims later than 2012/6/30 are excluded as well. Total number of employees included for this figure is
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Notes: This figure shows the incidence of nonfatal injuries per 100 equivalent full-time workers. Data is from



















Difference in # of Surgical Service between Facility and NonFacility
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation 1.4. Data is aggregated to the service-year level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the service level. The outcome variable is the total number of surgical services (in
log) for a subsample of elective procedures. The estimates show the differences over time in total number
of procedures between surgical services performed in facility and those in nonfacility settings. Definition
of elective procedures follows Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), including BETOS codes P2A, P2C, P2D, P3B,
P3C, P4B, P5A, P5B, P6A, P6B, P8A to P8H, and I4A. Elective surgical services are mostly major orthope-
dic procedures, ambulatory procedures, minor skin or musculoskeletal procedures, and endoscopy. See text
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Share of Visits to Specialists
(b)
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βt from equation A.1. Data is aggregated to the patient level
from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. Year is based on the date of a
worker’s first claim. To ensure the accurate coding of date of first claims, employees with first claims from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2005 are excluded. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in
maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at county
level based on employees’ places of residence. This set of figure show differences in referrals between
workers treated by physicians in healthcare networks and workers treated by physicians not in healthcare
networker.
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Table A.1: Total Quantity of Surgical Services (subset)
Log of Number of Non-Surgical Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Facility*Y2005 0.025 -0.030 0.045 -0.074
(0.034) (0.039) (0.038) (0.163)
Facility*Y2006 0.012 -0.015 -0.020 -0.025
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.093)
Facility*Y2008 0.005 0.029 -0.008 -0.067
(0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.098)
Facility*Y2009 0.055** 0.031 0.059* -0.156
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.101)
Facility*Y2010 0.178*** 0.088** 0.185*** -0.100
(0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.116)
Facility*Y2011 0.210*** 0.101** 0.184*** -0.042
(0.042) (0.048) (0.058) (0.132)
Facility*Y2012 0.189*** 0.092* 0.173*** 0.024
(0.049) (0.055) (0.062) (0.176)
Year FE X X X X
Service FE X X X X
Facility FE X X X X
N 6184 5432 4320 960
Mean of Dep. Var 5.12 5.07 5.31 4.70
Note: This table shows the estimates of βt from equation 1.4 using subsamples of
nonsurgical services defined below. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from
Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the
benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took ef-
fect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level. The
outcome variable is the total number of nonsurgical services (in log). The estimates
show the differences over time in total number of procedures between nonsurgical ser-
vices performed in facility and those in nonfacility settings. This set of figures explore
the complementariness between surgical and nonsurgical services. Column (1) uses a
subsample of nonsurgical services with certain surgical services during course of treat-
ment for the same patients, same as figure 1.10 (a). In comparison, column (2) uses a
subsample of nonsurgical services without any surgical services during course of treat-
ment for the same patients. Column (3) uses nonsurgical services that are performed
within 20 days of certain surgical services, same as figure 1.10 (b). Column (4) uses
nonsurgical services that are performed more than 20 days of certain surgical services.
See text in section 1.5.2 for more details. This set of estimates is to show nonsurgical
services which are related to surgical services have spillover effects from the increase
in payment for surgical services. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p
<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.2: Effect on Payment and Quantity by Diagnosis



















Facility*Y2005 0.001 0.076 0.015 0.044 -0.000 0.038
(0.069) (0.105) (0.027) (0.037) (0.036) (0.048)
Facility*Y2006 -0.050 0.037 -0.025 0.029 -0.062* 0.057
(0.065) (0.082) (0.030) (0.039) (0.034) (0.045)
Facility*Y2008 0.106 -0.071 0.092*** 0.086** 0.027 0.077
(0.085) (0.131) (0.030) (0.043) (0.036) (0.048)
Facility*Y2009 0.298*** 0.130 0.130*** 0.324*** 0.130*** 0.218***
(0.076) (0.134) (0.034) (0.043) (0.044) (0.054)
Facility*Y2010 0.264*** 0.452*** 0.145*** 0.458*** 0.185*** 0.524***
(0.096) (0.138) (0.032) (0.053) (0.051) (0.072)
Facility*Y2011 0.119 0.398*** 0.135*** 0.431*** 0.142*** 0.505***
(0.080) (0.149) (0.037) (0.057) (0.050) (0.077)
Facility*Y2012 0.221** 0.422*** 0.166*** 0.437*** 0.203*** 0.495***
(0.088) (0.154) (0.039) (0.053) (0.053) (0.090)
Year FE X X X X X X
Service FE X X X X X X
Facility FE X X X X X X
N 608 608 2544 2544 2624 2624
Mean of Dep. Var. 6.03 2.68 6.28 2.60 6.38 2.83
Note: This table shows the estimates of interaction terms of βt from equation 1.4, for three subsamples based
on ICD-9 diagnosis codes. Data is aggregated to the service-year level from Texas Workers’ Compensation
medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in maximum
reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the service level. This
table reports estimates for log of average payment and log of total number of procedures for surgical services.
Non-sprain injuries include burns, lacerations, and crushing wounds. The occupational disease category includes
carpal tunnel syndrome and herniated disc problems. This classification is adapted from Campolieti and Hyatt
(2006) and Card and McCall (1996). Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.3: Changes on the Number of Physicians and the Claims/Payment per Physician
Log(#Physicians) Log(#Claims) Log(Total Paid) Log(Avg Paid)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2005 0.091 0.289 0.131 0.013
(0.082) (0.190) (0.285) (0.304)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2006 0.071 0.200 -0.011 -0.103
(0.070) (0.165) (0.370) (0.362)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2008 0.125* 0.592*** 0.573** 0.401
(0.070) (0.181) (0.257) (0.284)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2009 0.168** 0.528** 0.735** 0.525*
(0.083) (0.219) (0.289) (0.298)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2010 0.242** 0.629*** 0.786*** 0.473*
(0.096) (0.229) (0.265) (0.255)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2011 0.311*** 0.835*** 0.979*** 0.566*
(0.096) (0.258) (0.325) (0.307)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2012 0.306*** 0.706*** 0.759* 0.375
(0.107) (0.252) (0.395) (0.358)
Year FE X X X X
Specialty FE X X X X
N 1384 1384 1384 1384
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.92 5.53 10.64 7.90
Note: This table shows the estimates of βt from equation A.2. Data is aggregated to physicians’ specialty-year
level from Texas Workers’ Compensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and
is set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard
errors are clustered at specialty level. Specialty is reported for each physician in the physician registry from Texas
Medical Board. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.4: Changes on the Number of Physicians and the Claims/Payment per Physician
Log(# Physicians) Log(# Claims) Log(Total Paid) Log(Avg Paid)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2005 0.086 0.285 0.127 0.014
(0.081) (0.191) (0.287) (0.305)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2006 0.067 0.197 -0.014 -0.102
(0.070) (0.165) (0.371) (0.363)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2008 0.127* 0.593*** 0.575** 0.401
(0.070) (0.181) (0.257) (0.284)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2009 0.172** 0.532** 0.738** 0.525*
(0.083) (0.219) (0.289) (0.297)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2010 0.249** 0.634*** 0.791*** 0.471*
(0.096) (0.229) (0.265) (0.255)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2011 0.321*** 0.842*** 0.986*** 0.564*
(0.095) (0.258) (0.326) (0.307)
SurgicalSpecialty*Y2012 0.319*** 0.715*** 0.768* 0.373
(0.107) (0.253) (0.395) (0.358)
Total # by Specialty X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Specialty FE X X X X
N 1384 1384 1384 1384
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.92 5.53 10.65 7.90
Note: This table shows the estimates of βt from equation A.2, with an additional control variable for total number
of physicians by speciality. Data is aggregated to physicians’ specialty-year level from Texas Workers’ Com-
pensation medical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The increase in
maximum reimbursement rates took effect on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at specialty
level. Specialty is reported for each physician in the physician registry from Texas Medical Board. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.5: Changes on the Number of Physicians by Group
















Total # by Specialty X X
Year FE X X
Specialty FE X X
N 1384 1384
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.30 1.92
Note: This table shows the estimates of βt from equation A.2 using
total number of physicians as the outcome variable, separately for ex-
isting physicians and new physicians. Data is aggregated to physi-
cians’ specialty-year level from Texas Workers’ Compensation med-
ical claims data from 2005 to 2012. β2007 is the benchmark and is
set to zero. The increase in maximum reimbursement rates took effect
on March 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at specialty
level. Specialty is reported for each physician in the physician registry
from Texas Medical Board. This table shows that number of physi-
cians increased more after 2008 from entry of physicians who have
never treated Workers’ Compensation patients before. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix: Cash-on-Hand and Demand for Credit
B.1 Additional Analysis
Reduced Form Analysis
I present the reduced form analysis as stated in equation 2.3 in table B.4. I present
the results on loan applications first. As EITC top-up rates increases by 10%, the number
of borrowers decreased by 6.3%, and the number of loan applications decreased by 8.1%.
For originated loans, number of borrowers with funded loans decreased by 7.1%, similar to
the loan application results although the the estimate is insignificant. This is likely due to
the reduced sample size in the originated loan data set, as the majority of loan applications
are denied or unfunded by lenders.
Cross-county Distribution of EITC benefits and Loan Applications
Figure B.1 shows the distribution of loan applications and the amount of EITC
benefits received across counties. Figure (a) shows the fraction of borrowers I observed in
loan-level data among the county-level population by decile, with the darker colors indi-
cating higher fractions. Figure (b) shows the actual amount of EITC benefits received at
county level by decile, with the darker colors indicating higher amounts. Comparing these
two figures, we can see that higher EITC benefits and a higher density of borrowers are
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located in southern and western areas, which could be due to common local characteristics
or economic shocks.1
Additional Checks on Balance of Characteristics across State Borders
In table B.1 and table B.2, I present additional checks on the balance of character-
istics across state borders. Other than the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics,
regulations in the small dollar credit market could be different across states as well. I ran
a similar specification using payday loan regulation as outcomes. The first panel uses an
indicator for the presence of regulations on loan size, interest rate, etc. The second panel
focuses on the specific regulations, for example, the maximum loan size or interest rate
allowed. The results in table B.1 show that the regulations are uncorrelated with the in-
strument, the generosity of state EITC benefits. Additionally, one might also be concerned
that people in different states might have different tax filing behaviors or use of financial
services. I also show in table B.2 that the use of direct deposit and refund anticipation
loans (RAL) or refund anticipation checks (RAC) is balanced across borders in the same
commuting zone.
Additional Placebo Analysis
I implemented an additional placebo check to ensure that the estimates presented
in previous sections are valid. First, I constructed placebo state boundaries to verify the
estimates are robust to omitted characteristics of geographical areas. Specifically, I divide
1 Cutoffs for the deciles of average EITC benefits (in $) are 1906, 1990, 2057, 2132, 2164, 2194, 2231,
2306, and 2476. Cutoffs for the deciles of fraction of borrowers (in %) are .16, .29, .48, .66, .81, 1.06, 1.26,
1.80, and 2.56.
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each CZ-state area in cross-border CZs into two pieces: the border area within 20 kilome-
ters of the state boundary and the remainder of the CZ-state area not directly bordering the
neighboring state. Thus the newly created “placebo boundary” is entirely inside the state.
Using this “placebo boundary” as the state border, I assign the border area a counterfactual
instrument (the simulated instrument for EITC benefits generosity) equal to that of neigh-
boring state and keep the true value of the simulated instrument for the other area. Then
I run the same specifications using this newly created instrument and control for CZ-state
fixed effects, instead of CZ fixed effects. The goal of this test is to show that the estimates
are robust to omitted variables that could be trending geographically from one state to
another. The results are reported in table B.3. As expected, estimates are insignificant,
indicating that it is unlikely that other characterizes trending geographically confound the
estimates.
Additional Analysis on Default Rate
I look at the default rate among all originated loans for the offshore/tribal lenders.
Offshore/tribal lenders on average have a higher default rate than state-licensed lenders
(32.7% vs. 26.3%). Table B.6 shows that $100 additional EITC benefits reduce the default
rate by 2.3 percentage points for offshore/tribal lenders. This is slightly higher than the
effects on state-licensed lenders shown in the text.
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Figure B.1
(a) Density of Borrowers across Counties
(b) Average EITC Benfits Received across Counties
Notes: Figure (a) shows the distribution of borrowers for small dollar loans across counties for year 2010 by
decile, with darker color indicating more borrowers. Figure (b) shows the distribution of average amount of
EITC benefits received across counties for year 2010 by decile, with darker color indicating higher average
EITC benefits.
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Table B.1: Check on Regulations on Payday Loans across State Borders
Balance in Regulations on Payday Loans
Coefficient of Log of Simulated IV
Dep. Var. Est. Std. Err. P-value Mean of Dep. Var.
Any Regulation on
Loan Size -0.797 0.636 0.220 0.094
Interest Rate 0.394 0.923 0.672 0.219
Rollover -0.888 1.072 0.414 0.625
Min Loan Term -0.440 1.035 0.673 0.688
Max Loan Term 0.498 0.869 0.571 0.188
Regulation on
Loan Size ($) 134.482 975.042 0.891 631.035
Interest Rate (APR) -435.840 800.342 0.591 498.299
Min Loan Term (Days) 4.130 11.527 0.729 11.300
Max Loan Term (Days) -0.641 41.975 0.988 39.000
Note: This table shows the coefficients of the simulated instrument from equation 2.3 on state
level regulations on small dollar credit products such as payday loans. Data on regulations are
from National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The sample includes only zipcode areas
in commuting zones that span state borders. Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting
zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table B.2: Check on EITC Eligibility and Tax Filing
Balance in EITC Eligibility and Tax Filing
Coefficient of Log of Simulated IV
Dep. Var. Est. Std. Err. P-value Mean of Dep. Var.
Eligible for EITC 0.011 0.061 0.857 0.199
Used Direct Deposit -0.004 0.056 0.949 0.774
Used Paid Tax Prep 0.029 0.063 0.649 0.577
Used RAL or RAC 0.005 0.003 0.131 0.289
Note: This table shows the coefficients of the simulated instrument from equation 2.3
on zip5 level outcomes, including fraction of the population being eligible for EITC,
used direct deposit and used paid tax prepraration services. The sample includes only
zipcode areas in commuting zones that span state borders. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table B.3: Placebo Test
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications - Placebo Borders
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower) #Loans ln(#Loans)
Avg EITC -55.339 -0.906 -78.949 -0.920
(62.085) (0.854) (92.557) (0.878)
Mean of Dep. Var. 92.293 3.088 144.101 3.469
N 5089 5089 5089 5089
Total Population X X X X
Income Distributions X X X X
CZ-State FE X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Note: This table shows the coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specifica-
tion in equation 2.4, using SimEITCst as an instrument for AvgEITCst. Placebo borders
are completely within a state. CZ-state specific FE are included. See text for details. Data
is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression restricts to states that allow payday loans and
state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and
VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p
<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table B.4: Reduced Form (Loan Applications)
Effects of EITC on Loan Applications - Reduced Form
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -8.886** -7.200*** -4.168*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.063***
(3.517) (2.371) (1.521) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015)
Mean of Dep. Var. 109.648 107.49 81.80741 3.213837 3.174835 2.989484
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -15.779* -12.341** -7.873** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.081***
(8.059) (5.650) (3.366) (0.027) (0.025) (0.020)
Mean of Dep. Var. 167.5534 166.0037 127.4655 3.597145 3.556829 3.361337
N 1818 3241 6750 1818 3241 6750
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distribution X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation 2.4, without in-
strumenting AvgEITCst using SimEITCst.The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas in the same commuting
zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 10 km of state borders,
and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level.
This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefund-
able state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p
<0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table B.5: Reduced Form (Originated Loans)
Effects of EITC on Originated Loans - Reduced Form
#Borrowers ln(#Borrower)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -1.445*** -1.776*** -1.257** -0.081* -0.098** -0.071
(0.265) (0.355) (0.500) (0.042) (0.037) (0.043)
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.625 15.210 11.367 2.133 2.078 1.826
#Loans ln(#Loans)
10 km 20 km all 10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC 5.021** 3.106 3.326 0.019 -0.022 0.011
(1.942) (2.296) (2.765) (0.066) (0.065) (0.073)
Mean of Dep. Var. 11.258 14.499 14.365 1.886 2.071 2.076
N 646 1127 2016 646 1127 2016
Total Population X X X X X X
Income Distributions X X X X X X
CZ FE X X X X X X
Census Region FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Note: This table shows coefficients on average EITC (in $100) received using specification in equation 2.4,
without instrumenting AvgEITCst using SimEITCst.The column named “all” includes all ZIP5 areas in
the same commuting zones that span state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas
within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20 km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of
state borders. Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to states that allow payday loans
and state-licensed lenders. States with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA). Robust
standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. * p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table B.6: IV Estimates (Default Rate for Offshore/Tribal Lenders)
Effects of EITC on Default Rate - IV Estimates
offshore/tribal lenders
10 km 20 km all
Avg EITC -0.012* -0.021*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.336 0.336 0.327
N 1618 2840 5878
Total Population X X X
Income Distribution X X X
CZ FE X X X
Census Region FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Note: This table shows coefficients on average EITC (in $100)
received using specification in equation 2.4, without instrument-
ing AvgEITCst using SimEITCst. The column named “all”
includes all ZIP5 areas in the same commuting zones that span
state borders. The column named “10 km” is restricted to to ZIP5
areas within 10 km of state borders, and the column named “20
km” is restricted to to ZIP5 areas within 20 km of state borders.
Data is the ZIP5-year level. This set of regression is restricted to
states that allow payday loans and state-licensed lenders. States
with nonrefundable state EITC are excluded (DE, ME and VA).
Robust standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level.
* p <0.10 , ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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